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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates legitimacy processes in the field of international 
development through an examination of the narrative construction and maintenance of 
legitimacy (i.e., legitimacy processes) in one international development organization, the 
United State Peace Corps, over the thirty-five year period from 1977 to 2012. The study 
builds on research in organizational sociology and development studies in order to 
improve our understanding of international development and explain the persistence of 
international development organizations. Drawing on an extensive analysis of a wide 
range of organizational documents and congressional discourse, I show how the 
construction and maintenance of legitimacy is a negotiated, and sometimes contested, 
process that involves a wide range of legitimacy claims. In sum, this study demonstrates 
the multi-faceted nature of legitimacy, both in terms of the range and types of legitimacy 
available, as well as the strategies deployed to establish and maintain organizational 
legitimacy over time.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Over the past five decades, Peace Corps Volunteers have served in nearly 140 countries, 
bringing a wealth of practical assistance to those working to build better lives for 
themselves and their communities. From the first group of volunteers to arrive in Ghana 
and Tanzania in August 1961, they have been emissaries of hope and goodwill to the far 
corners of our world, strengthening the ties of friendship between the people of the 
United States and those of other countries. Living and working alongside those they 
serve, volunteers help address changing and complex global needs in education, health 
and HIV/AIDS, business and information technology, agriculture, environmental 
protection, and youth development. With each village that now has access to clean water, 
each young woman who has received an education, and each family empowered to 
prevent disease because of the service of a Peace Corps Volunteer, President Kennedy's 
noble vision lives on. 
 
       President Barack Obama (2011) 




 On March 1, 2011, the United States Peace Corps celebrated its fiftieth 
anniversary. To mark this historic event, President Barack Obama released a presidential 
proclamation that captured much of the pride and sense of accomplishment those 
affiliated with the Peace Corps felt in recognizing this milestone. The President noted the 
far reach of the organization, now having sent over 210,000 volunteers to 139 nations, 
and articulated its perceived impact on the individuals, communities, and countries in 
which Peace Corps volunteers have served. What began as an idea for a government 
agency expressed on a whim during a late night speech by President John F. Kennedy in 
1961 was now an organization that circled the globe.  
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 The Peace Corps’ approach to international assistance, what it refers to as 
“people-to-people” development, distinguishes the agency from other elements of the 
U.S. international aid regime. During its five decades of existence, the Peace Corps has 
sought to address the needs of individuals and communities abroad by sending volunteer 
citizens for extended periods to live and work with those at the grassroots. Over its 
history, the agency has had to navigate many challenges, including changes in 
presidential administrations, fluctuations in Congress, and several significant geopolitical 
shifts including the end of the Cold War. Despite these challenges, the agency has 
persisted.  
 This dissertation seeks to make a contribution to the understanding of 
organizational persistence in the field of international development by exploring in detail 
the construction and maintenance of organizational legitimacy at the United States Peace 
Corps. In conducting this study, it was my intention to use the case of the Peace Corps as 
a window to investigate a set of more general social processes that contribute to the 
persistence of organizations working in the field of international development. I therefore 
intend that the findings from this dissertation will have wider relevance in advancing our 
understanding of this complex and dynamic field of activity. Before moving on to the 
questions that animate this project and findings of this study, however, I make explicit the 
theoretical points of departure for the project.  
 
Organizational Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy is central to organizational and institutional research. 
Sociological interest in legitimacy traces back to Weber’s analysis of the legitimate types 
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of authority (1958) and Parson’s (1960) research on organizational goals, social values, 
and legitimate claims to resources. Later work by Meyer and Rowan (1977) established 
the basic premise that legitimacy enhances organizational persistence and solidified 
legitimacy as a core concept in the study of organizations and institutionalization. Meyer 
and Rowan’s (1977) influential research examined how legitimacy buffers organizations 
from external pressures. The authors developed arguments explaining how organizations 
gain and maintain legitimacy by adhering to institutional expectations through ceremonial 
enactments of cultural scripts. In short, organizations do not gain and maintain legitimacy 
simply because they function as rational, bureaucratic organizations, but because they 
appear to do so.  
Common to all sociological studies of legitimacy is the understanding that it is 
socially constructed. Meyer and Scott (1983) defined organizational legitimacy as the 
“degree of cultural support for an organization” (p. 201). Building on his three pillars of 
institutions framework, Scott (1995) later elaborated this definition arguing that 
organizational legitimacy is defined by, and derives from, consonance with “relevant 
rules and laws, normative support, or alignment with cultural-cognitive frameworks” (p. 
59). Perhaps the most widely-used definition comes from Suchman (1995), who 
conceptualized legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). Organizational legitimacy, in short, is 
multi-faceted and dependent on a wide and varying range of elements. Drawing on an 
extensive review of organizational and institutional research, Suchman (1995) sought to 
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bring this complexity into a general framework and, in doing so, identified three types1 of 
legitimacy—pragmatic, moral, and cognitive—each with their own subtypes.  
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on a constituent’s2 assessment that a given 
organization will directly or indirectly pursue his or her interests. Suchman (1995) 
identifies three variants of pragmatic legitimacy: (1) exchange legitimacy derives from 
the expected value of a particular organizational policy or activity for a given constituent. 
In short, the organization produces outputs that constituents value who, in turn, provide 
their support for the organization; (2) influence legitimacy rests not on an exchange for a 
specific desired output, but a sense on the part of the constituent that the organization is 
being responsive to his or her larger subjectively perceived interests; (3) finally, 
dispositional legitimacy relies on the personification of an organization wherein the 
constituent grants legitimacy based on the belief that the organization “has our best 
interest at heart,” “shares our values,” or is “honest, trustworthy, decent, or wise” 
(Suchman 1995:579). Suchman (1995) adds that dispositional legitimacy can serve to 
dampen or delimit the negative effects of organizational failures by converting “positive 
evaluations of specific organizational acts into generalized perceptions of organizational 
legitimacy” (p. 579). 
Second, moral legitimacy3 is accorded to an organization that reflects socially 
desirable norms, standards, and values. It is based on a constituent’s normative evaluation 
                                                 
1 This typology mirrors Scott’s (1995) distinctions between regulatory, normative, and cognitive types of 
legitimacy associated with his conceptualization of the three pillars of institutions.  
2 The term constituent is used here in a generic sense to refer to the various internal and external audiences, 
stakeholders, and constituents (e.g., stockholders, regulators, or politicians) organizations encounter and 
rely on for legitimacy.  
3 Deephouse and Suchman (2008) note that Suchman’s (1995) category of moral legitimacy is often used 
interchangeably with normative legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995). However, they argue 
that this is problematic because scholars often operationalize normative legitimacy in a narrow way as 
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or perception that the goals and/or activities of the organization are “right” and “just.” 
Suchman (1995) identifies four variants of moral legitimacy: (1) consequential legitimacy 
relies on an evaluation of an organization based on criteria and output measures specific 
to the organization type (e.g., a school is judged relative to other schools based on 
standard criteria). Organizations operating in fields with clearly defined and measurable 
outcomes will typically have an easier time generating this type of legitimacy than 
organizations operating in fields with more ambiguous outcomes; (2) procedural 
legitimacy accrues to organizations that embrace socially accepted techniques and 
practices. The use of “proper procedures” demonstrates that the organization is making a 
“good faith” effort to achieve organizational goals; (3) structural legitimacy derives from 
an assessment that the organization is valuable because its structural characteristics place 
it within a category of organizations considered appropriate for the job; (4) finally, 
personal legitimacy relies on the charisma and reputation of organizational leaders. For 
example, one could argue that Apple Inc. derived legitimacy through the perceived value 
of having Steve Jobs as its organizational leader. 
Third, cognitive legitimacy rests on taken-for-granted cultural assumptions about 
the organization. That is, because an organization “makes sense” to a constituent he or 
she accepts the organization as necessary or inevitable. Suchman (1995) identifies two 
variants of cognitive legitimacy: (1) comprehensibility refers to the extent to which 
cultural models exist that simplify environmental complexity and uncertainty and provide 
constituents with plausible explanations for the existence of an organization and its 
activities; (2) taken-for-granted legitimacy is achieved when alternatives to an 
                                                                                                                                                 
normative isomorphism through the adoption of the ethics and worldviews of formal professions. Moral 
legitimacy is intended to refer to congruence with broader social values (Deephouse and Suchman 2008).  
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organization are beyond consideration. This type of organizational legitimacy 
approximates institutionalization wherein it would be difficult for a constituent to 
imagine life without the organization. Indeed, Meyer and Scott (1983) argue that a 
“completely legitimate organization would be one about which no questions are raised” 
(p. 201). Although the surest way for an organization to prevent legitimacy challenges 
and persist is to achieve widespread cognitive legitimacy, this is the most difficult type of 
legitimacy to acquire because it requires organizational managers to convince 
constituents that they are the singular organization appropriate for a given task. 
In addition to the types of organizational legitimacy above, Black (2008) notes 
that legitimacy can differ significantly “across time and space, and between actors, 
systems, and contexts” (p. 145). Indeed, different actors’ or entities’ perceptions of 
whether an organization is legitimate may be based on different types of legitimacy 
evaluations. For example, one individual might view the international organization World 
Vision as legitimate because it embodies their religious ideology (a moral evaluation), 
while another individual views the organization as legitimate because it advances their 
interest of reducing the incidence of AIDS (a pragmatic evaluation). The legitimacy 
accorded to the various roles of an organization can also vary (Black 2008; Suchman 
1995). An aid organization such as Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, “might be 
perceived as legitimate in providing humanitarian relief for those affected by civil war 
but not in lobbying for regime change” (Edwards and Hulme 1995, cited in Black 
2008:145). 
In order to survive, organizations must gain and maintain legitimacy by 
navigating these complex legitimacy dynamics. This reality presents a key operational 
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challenge for organizations and their managers. It is to a discussion of how organizational 
scholars have explained these processes that I now turn. 
 
Gaining, Maintaining, and Repairing: Legitimacy Processes and Strategies  
Theoretical approaches to legitimacy differ primarily in the extent to which they 
see legitimacy as deriving from features of the institutional environment (i.e., structure) 
or from instrumental action on the part of organizational actors (i.e., agency). Institutional 
theorists emphasize the ways in which broad structural forces shape legitimacy dynamics 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). In short, some scholars theorize that legitimating 
environments present organizations and their members with taken-for-granted scripts, 
rules, and classifications (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), which serve as dominant 
cognitive models that guide organizational structure and behavior (Scott 1994; Meyer and 
Scott 1994). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that, because of institutional pressures, 
organizations conform to their environments by incorporating accepted structural features 
and practices into the organization to maintain legitimacy. Although institutional theorists 
contend that cultural pressures transcend any single organization’s purposive control, 
they do not conceptualize organizations simply as passive recipients of external 
legitimacy evaluations (Black 2008). Indeed, Meyer and Rowan (1977) demonstrated that 
organizations can play a role in constructing their own legitimacy claims but, once again, 
the cultural pressures in a given organizational environment shape and constrain these 
claims.  
In contrast to institutional approaches to legitimacy, scholars working in the 
strategic-interests tradition place greater emphasis on managerial behavior, 
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conceptualizing organizations as instrumental actors operating in institutional and 
organizational environments. Organizations and their managers extract legitimacy from 
their cultural environments through the manipulation and deployment of symbols in order 
to gain support (Pfeffer 1981). This perspective imagines managers as strategic actors 
who, although shaped and constrained by their environments, have the ability to influence 
the perceptions of others to benefit the organization (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Lister 
(2003) points out, for example, that Northern NGOs have a tendency in organizational 
discourse to emphasize their close connections with “local” people in the “South” who 
are “partners” in the development process. Indeed, she shows how some Northern NGOs 
use references to development “partners” and their assumed wishes strategically in 
organizational discourse to justify the agency’s own plans.4  
In seeking to reconcile the theoretical differences between institutional and 
strategic-interests perspectives of organizational legitimacy, Suchman (1995) argues that 
“real world organizations face both strategic operational challenges and institutional 
constitutive pressures,” thus, one must examine “both the ways in which legitimacy acts 
like a manipulable resource and the ways in which it acts like a taken-for-granted belief 
system” (p. 577). To understand how organizations manage legitimacy, then, one must 
provide an account of the socially constructed cultural system within which the 
organization is embedded and explain how organizational managers use various strategies 
to gain, maintain, and repair legitimacy once it is lost (Suchman 1995; Ashforth and 
Gibbs 1990).  
                                                 
4 Lister (2003) argues that, as a consequence of this “issues [are] automatically settled and seen as beyond 
question if they [can] be claimed to be either for the partner’s benefit, or to prevent the partner from 
encountering problems, whether or not the partner [was] consulted on the issue” (p. 184).   
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As noted, a key element to understanding legitimacy processes is to account for 
the cultural system within which an organization is embedded. Questions derive from an 
examination of the interplay between institutional logics and the legitimacy processes of 
organizations. Institutional logics, understood as “the belief systems and practices that 
predominate in an organizational field,” provide a framework or metric for determining 
the legitimacy of an organization and, therefore, shape and constrain the legitimacy 
strategies available to organizations5 (Scott 2001:139). What is more, organizations may 
operate in environments where institutional logics place competing or contradictory 
pressures on organizations. Consider a logic of effectiveness, for example: how does a 
development organization maintain legitimacy if effectiveness is not demonstrated?  In 
other words, if the logic of effectiveness is central to the legitimacy of development 
organizations, yet these organizations do little or are unable to demonstrate effectiveness, 
what other logics mask or render failures and underwhelming outcomes invisible? This is 
one of several questions addressed in this dissertation. 
A related issue is the extent to which the performance of an organization is 
scrutinized or challenged. Meyer and Rowan (1978) demonstrate that in some instances 
the legitimacy of an organization is not challenged because it benefits from a logic of 
confidence. That is, there exists an assumption on the part of constituents that the 
organization is making a good faith effort to achieve its organizational aims or purpose. 
In other instances, however, organizations may be subject to close scrutiny. For example, 
Hirsch and Andrews (1986) argue that over time organizations may have to navigate 
                                                 
5 Thornton and Ocasio (1999) define institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their 
material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (p. 804). This 
definition, according to Thornton and Ocasio (2008), provides “a link between individual agency and 
cognition and socially constructed institutional practices and rule structures” (p. 101).  
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performance or value challenges in order to maintain legitimacy and, therefore, persist. 
Performance challenges refer to situations where an organization is perceived by relevant 
constituents as having failed to “deliver the goods” or meet organizational objectives. In 
contrast, value challenges call the entire organization’s existence into question 
irrespective of its ability to meet organizational objectives (Hirsch and Andrews 1986).  
In addition to understanding the broad cultural systems that shape, constrain, and 
challenge organizations, one must explain how organizations achieve and maintain 
legitimacy within the system over time. Organizations can attempt to conform to 
legitimacy claims that are made of them. In other words, organizations may look to their 
institutional environments for socially accepted structures and practices and change 
accordingly. For example, a company wishing to raise its status in a given industry might 
restructure itself in a way to resemble the dominant players in that sector. This approach 
is perhaps the easiest way for an organization to gain legitimacy in that congruence with 
dominant models, by definition, brings the organization in line with the dictates or desires 
of established audiences. It should be noted, however, that trouble can arise in instances 
where an organization only ceremonially conforms to dominant models (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977).  
A second legitimacy strategy available to organizations is to conform selectively 
to legitimacy claims. Here, an organization seeks out an environment that is most 
favorable to its existing structure and mission and positions itself accordingly. An 
organization might engage in market research to identify audiences who are most likely 
to value what the organization has to offer. A third option is for an organization to engage 
in informing actions that utilize various communication strategies and legitimated 
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vocabularies (Meyer and Rowan 1977) that serve to socially legitimate its goals and 
activities. For example, an organization can develop and deploy messaging that explains 
the rationale for specific organizational activity by linking it to established societal 
values. Finally, organizations can seek to manipulate the institutional environment by 
managing myths, ceremonies, and symbols to create new legitimating beliefs or seek to 
develop new constituents (Suchman 1995). Here, an organization might develop 
elaborate accountability mechanisms and publish annual reports that signal to 
constituents that the organization is engaged in legitimate activities. Each of the 
legitimacy strategies above can be adapted based on the type of legitimacy under 
consideration—pragmatic, moral, and cognitive—and whether the organization is seeking 
to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy (Suchman 1995). 
It should be clear thus far that legitimacy processes are based fundamentally on 
communication between organizations and their constituents. In engaging in this 
exchange, organizations present a particular version of reality to audiences and 
constituents then react by granting or withholding legitimacy. Similar to conversations 
between two individuals, exchanges between an organization and its constituents is a 
dynamic process that provides an analytic window into legitimacy processes and 
strategies, an issue to which I now turn.  
 
Legitimacy and the Organizational Presentation of Self 
In explaining interaction among individuals, Goffman (1967) argued that people 
develop various representations of themselves that they must work to maintain in 
encounters with others. If an individual is successful at impression management, the 
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audience is more likely to respond positively, define the individual as a desirable social 
actor, and accept her “projected definition of the situation” (Sandstrom et al. 2014:142). 
In instances where an individual fails to maintain a positive impression of herself, there is 
the possibility that she will lose credibility with her audience (i.e., “lose face”) and, 
consequently, lose support.   
Similar to individuals, organizations can be viewed as actors that engage in 
performances across various settings and before different audiences (Allan and Caillouet 
1994). Galaskiewicz (1985), for example, showed how companies engage in impression 
management by donating to charities in order to enhance their public image. Others have 
shown how company spokespeople use narrative accounts and impression management 
tactics to manage legitimacy following controversial events or activities (Elsbach 1994; 
Elsbach and Sutton 1992). Meyer and Rowan (1977) also drew on Goffman’s work in 
their discussion of decoupling. The authors explained that to maintain legitimacy, 
organizations must overcome instances where there exists no or limited technical 
validation of organizational activities. In these situations, legitimacy is maintained when 
constituents conclude that the organization is working in good faith.  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) went on to argue that to maintain impressions, 
organizations may engage in practices that preserve the formal structure of the 
organization but do not subject it to close inspection. Scott and Meyer (1991) show, for 
example, that corporate representatives offer legitimating accounts to make their actions 
acceptable and understandable to others when they face situations where organizational 
compliance with the normative expectations of their institutional environment is 
questioned. Such practices ultimately reinforce “confidence in the myths that rationalize 
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the organization’s existence” and, thereby mitigate potential legitimacy problems (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977:358). Recent work on organizational legitimacy and institutional logics 
builds on this research and turns its attention toward issues of framing and the narrative 
foundations of organizational legitimacy (see Thornton et al. 2012 for a review of this 
research).  
 
Frames, Narratives, and Legitimacy 
As noted, the processes of gaining, maintaining, and repairing legitimacy involve 
a significant amount of organizational “impression management” (Goffman 1955). And 
like most cultural processes, the management of legitimacy rests heavily on 
communication (Suchman 1995). Budget justifications, annual shareholder reports, 
websites, and monthly newsletters all reflect instances where organizations present 
themselves to an audience and seek to create an impression. In developing these 
discourses, organizations frame their activities and construct narratives6 about their work. 
Recent research has emphasized the utility of studying legitimacy processes and 
strategies through the lens of these types of discourse. Of particular interest is how 
organizations utilize frames and narratives to construct and maintain legitimacy 
(Thornton et al. 2012; Babb 2009; Phillips and Malhotra 2008). 
Goffman (1974) first used the concept of frames to refer to interpretive devices 
that allow individuals or groups to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” events and 
occurrences (p. 21). Framing gives meaning, organizes experiences, and guides the 
                                                 
6 Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) define narrative as “a story or account that organizes events and 
human actions into a whole, thereby attributing significance to individual actions and events according to 
their effect on the story or account,” adding that “narratives help to make sense of events, create legitimacy, 
and construct identities” (p. 155). 
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actions of organizations (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). In sociology, 
framing has received the most attention from political sociologists and social movement 
scholars. Snow and Benford (1988), for example, show how sets of beliefs and meanings 
(i.e., frames) emerge in the formation of social movements that ultimately serve to 
animate and legitimize movement activity. In a recent study of framing in political 
discourse, Babb (2009) showed how the U.S. Treasury Department, on behalf of the 
executive branch, used various rationales as interpretive frames in order to elicit 
Congressional support for funding multilateral development banks. In this instance, the 
U.S. Treasury relied on economic, humanitarian, and strategic frames to justify U.S. 
government expenditures for the banks. Babb (2009) also found, however, that the 
justifications put forward by the U.S. Treasury were not always successful in garnering 
congressional support. Thus, Babb (2009) points out that despite concerted attempts to 
shape debates, “political actors are constrained in the frames that they can apply to a 
particular issue by real-world evidence, the beliefs and political biases of their audience, 
and their own ideology and political platform” (p. xiii). In short, frames are context 
specific and historically situated and, as such, may need to change over time to fit 
particular political and social realities to be effective.  
A frame’s existence and efficacy also relies on the creation of effective narratives 
and stories (Sandstrom et al. 2014). Indeed, narratives are the means through which 
frames take tangible form. Thornton et al. (2012) explain that narratives “reflect specific 
organizing practices, their development, and their outcomes” and, thus help to “create 
legitimacy and construct identities” (p. 155). Moreover, narratives give organizational 
activity and outcomes meaning by helping “organizational actors make sense of their 
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successes or failures” (Abolafia 2010:350). In his examination of the creation and 
maintenance of group culture among social movements, for example, Fine (1995) shows 
how narratives are used to construct shared meanings about the achievements and 
challenges of specific social movements. Narratives also serve as a medium through 
which the actions of groups are interpreted and perceived by those outside of the group 
(Sandstrom et al. 2014).  
Recent work in the sociology of organizations uses narrative as a focal point for 
studying organizational legitimacy. Indeed, Golant and Sillince (2007) argue that 
narrative is at the center of the emergence and maintenance of organizational legitimacy. 
The authors argue that focusing on the role of narrative in the constitution of 
organizational legitimacy allows scholars to bridge the structure-agency divide that 
hampers much organizational and institutional research. It is possible through an 
examination of framing and narratives to better understand how organizational managers 
instrumentally use language to “signal the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
organizational activities” to various constituents and show how organizations draw on 
and are shaped by dominant scripts and logics in their institutional environments (Gloant 
and Sillince 2008:1152). 
Jacobs and Sobieraj (2007) illustrate, for example, how politicians use specific 
types of narratives during congressional debates to connect the policies they are 
proposing to their individual requirements for legitimacy and the needs of the public. 
Similarly, Abolafia (2010) examines narrative construction among central bankers at the 
Federal Reserve to show how managers make sense of complex operating environments 
and organizational activities by drawing on available logics. A recent study by Golant 
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and Sillince (2007) examines the narrative foundations of organizational legitimacy in the 
healthcare field. The authors conclude that organizational legitimacy in the healthcare 
field is dependent on both “the persuasiveness of organizational storytelling and the 
realization of a taken-for-granted narrative structure” in organizational discourse (p. 
1149).  
 
Legitimacy, Development, and the Peace Corps 
Research in development studies gives limited treatment to the topic of 
organizational legitimacy (Lister 2003). Moreover, studies of international development 
that do take organizational legitimacy into account focus almost exclusively on non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). These studies identify a handful of characteristics 
thought to enhance organizational legitimacy, including: legal compliance (Edwards 
1999), representativeness (Hudson 2000; Atack 1999), and consistency between an 
organization’s mission and its actual behavior (Saxby 1996). Moreover, Edwards and 
Hulme (1995) assert that “performing effectively and accounting transparently are 
essential components of responsible practice, on which the legitimacy of development 
intervention ultimately depends” (p. 6). It is not clear, however, the extent to which these 
technical-functional metrics are actually used to determine the legitimacy of development 
organizations. What is more, this literature is just beginning to consider the socially 
constructed, institutional character of organizational legitimacy in the field of 
international development (Ossewaarde, Nijhof, and Heyse 2008; Lister 2003). An 
additional shortcoming of this literature is its tendency to rely on cross-sectional designs, 
which ignore the important historical and temporal dimensions of organizational 
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legitimacy in the field of international development (Lister 2003). Indeed, we know that 
the ideas and practices that animate the field of international development have evolved 
since the advent of the modern development regime and in response to major global 
political changes, such as the end of the Cold War. As such, we would expect that 
organizations working in the field have also changed over this period. 
This dissertation investigates the issues raised above by asking the following 
questions: How do development organizations maintain legitimacy? How do 
development organizations present themselves in different historical periods and political 
climates? Under what conditions and in what combinations are different legitimacy 
strategies deployed?  
To address these questions, I examine the narrative construction and maintenance 
of legitimacy (i.e., legitimacy processes) in one international development organization, 
the United State Peace Corps, from 1977 to 2012. The United States Peace Corps 
emerged during a lesser-noticed expansion of the post-war development regime. Between 
1958 and 1965 nearly every major industrialized nation established a volunteer-based 
international development program aimed at spreading the message of economic 
development and demonstrating the “good will” of the West (Hoffman 2001). 
International volunteer organizations were built, in content and form, on quintessential 
notions of what was required to “make men modern” (Inkeles and Smith 1976). In short, 
international development volunteers were dispersed to act as mediators between the 
“modern” ways of the West and the so-called “backward” ways of the rest. Today, nearly 
fifty-three years after its establishment by President John F. Kennedy, the Peace Corps 
continues to send volunteer development workers throughout the world.  
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Overview of Dissertation  
 
The broad goals of this dissertation are to improve our understanding of 
international development and explain the persistence of international development 
organizations through the lens of legitimacy processes and strategies. The study is based 
on the analysis of data collected through extensive archival research at the National 
Archives and Peace Corps Headquarters in Washington D.C., and from the Government 
Records Repository at the University of Minnesota Libraries. In addition, I supplemented 
my analysis of archival data through in-depth interviews with current Peace Corps 
administrators and staff at Peace Corps Headquarters in Washington D.C. 
 The dissertation proceeds with a methodological chapter that details the case 
selection and research design, followed by three empirical chapters. Chapter Three, 
Development as a Virtuous Endeavor centers on an examination of how discourses of 
modernization and narratives about the “goodness” of the development effort and the 
benevolence of the United States and its people are constructed and reconstructed over 
time. In short, the chapter investigates how ideas and assumptions about development 
activities and the work of the Peace Corps are viewed and presented through a lens that 
constructs the aims and activities of the organization as virtuous, centering legitimacy in 
the context of modernization. In short, shared understandings of the goodness of 
development and benevolence of the volunteer create myths about the organization and 
its activities that shield the organization from close scrutiny. 
 Chapter Four, Balancing Benevolence and Politics analyzes the political pressures 
faced by the Peace Corps and how the organization responds to these pressures over time. 
Throughout the history of the organization, the agency must engage in a strategic back 
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and forth with presidential administrations and members of Congress over the aims and 
activities of the organization. Thus, the chapter examines the nature of these external 
pressures and investigates how the Peace Corps and its leadership manage legitimacy 
challenges over time.  
Chapter Five, Managing Accountability examines how the organization adapts to 
the rise of the accountability regime in the 1990s and beyond. During this period, all 
government agencies were facing greater scrutiny. Congress passed the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in 1993, which mandated that all government 
agencies develop clear, measurable performance outcomes that they had to report to 
Congress annually. The GPRA created new political and cultural pressures on the 
organization to have legitimate, rational processes in place to measure organizational 
performance. The chapter examines how the organization responded when its legitimacy 
was, in part, dependent on adherence to Congress through a formal accountability 
mechanism. I show how Congressional action regarding greater agency accountability led 
to the coupling of virtuous goals with virtuous procedures. I further show how the shared 
positive assumptions of the agency and development, in general, discussed in Chapter 
Three created space for the establishment of an accountability regime that was largely 
ceremonial in nature.  
 Finally, Chapter Six, Conclusion and Closing Thoughts, briefly reiterates the 
main conclusions of the study and considers its theoretical implications for understanding 
legitimacy processes in the field of international development. In addition, I consider the 
dissertation’s limitations and potential avenues for future research.  









As noted above, the broad goals of this dissertation are to improve our 
understanding of international development and explain the persistence of international 
development organizations through the lens of legitimacy processes and strategies. To 
address these goals, the research design seeks to achieve three specific objectives: (1) 
detail the construction and maintenance of organizational legitimacy over historical time, 
(2) determine the extent to which institutional logics shape and constrain legitimacy 
processes; and (3) incorporate both interest-based and cultural arguments of 
organizational legitimacy to explain organizational persistence in the field of 
international development. The following questions guide my analysis:    
 
How do development organizations maintain legitimacy? How do development 
organizations present themselves in different historical periods and political 
climates? Under what conditions and in what combinations are different 
legitimacy strategies deployed?  
 
To address the objectives and questions raised above, this project examines the 
construction and maintenance of legitimacy (i.e., legitimacy processes) in one 
international development organization, the United State Peace Corps, from 1977 to 
2012. The Peace Corps represents an interesting and important theoretical case for 
understanding legitimacy processes. The Peace Corps emerged as a foreign policy tool in 
the Cold War, like many other agencies and initiatives. However, the Peace Corps was 
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the only agency proposed and designed to work at the grassroots level through what the 
agency refers to as “people-to-people” development. The Peace Corps’ distinction from 
other U.S. foreign policy tools is articulated clearly in the agency’s 2001 budget 
justification:  
 
Peace Corps volunteers’ service differs from the approach taken by other 
governmental agencies and international development organizations. Volunteers 
are engaged at the grassroots level, and they are required to speak local languages. 
A fundamental purpose of their service is to develop a knowledge of the host 
country and to forge lasting relationships with individuals in their communities 
(Justification 2001:9). 
 
In short, the U.S. government sees the Peace Corps as a unique tool for development and 
for advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives. As such, an examination of the agency 
provides a unique window into how the U.S. government, over time, conceptualizes 
development and draws on this conceptualization to design development programming 
and administer U.S. foreign policy abroad. Moreover, although there are many historical 
studies of the Peace Corps from its founding through the Nixon administration, there 
exists limited research of the organization from the 1980s to present.  
In my analysis, contrasts are drawn between institutional logics that predominate 
in the field of international development and organizational legitimacy strategies 
associated with the U.S. Peace Corps. Comparisons are made across periods demarcated 
by changes in presidential administration, as well as preceding and following events (e.g., 
end of Cold War or implementation of an accountability regime) that mark significant 
turning points for the organization. 
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Data 
The data I analyze to address each of the objectives and questions above includes 
congressional legislative histories and floor debate, sub-committee hearings and 
witness/agency testimony obtained from the Congressional Record archives. In addition, 
I examined reports by the Congressional Research Office, Government Accountability 
Office, and the Office of Management and Budget produced at the request of members of 
Congress. Such reports cover a range of topics related to the Peace Corps’ operations and 
are intended to serve as a supplement to agency testimony. Data also include a wide 
range of organizational documents, including Peace Corps annual reports, congressional 
budget justifications, and agency newsletters produced between 1977 and 2012.7  Data 
were collected at the National Archives and Peace Corps Headquarters in Washington 
D.C., and from the Government Records Repository at the University of Minnesota 
Libraries. I also examined notable news clippings and commentaries regarding the Peace 
Corps that were published in the popular press or distributed by think tanks such as the 
Heritage Foundation. In total, the amount of empirical data consisted of many thousands 
of pages of archive material. Together, these documents provide a rich source of policy-
related discourse and, in the aggregate, offer important information about the policy 
agendas of Congress and the Peace Corps, frames of meaning used to justify particular 
policy decisions, and areas of contestation.    
In addition, I sought to triangulate my analysis of archival data through in-depth 
interviews with current Peace Corps administrators and staff at Peace Corps Headquarters 
                                                 
7 I also utilized several additional data sources as needed (e.g., training manuals, volunteer newsletters, 
etc.) to investigate how specific policies resulting from congressional action were or were not translated 
into volunteer training modules. In short, these materials provided insight into the enactment of 
organizational and congressional ideals. 
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in Washington D.C. I interviewed individuals working in development planning, 
evaluation and assessment, and organizational operations. The purpose of these 
interviews was to develop a sense for current organizational practices, challenges and 
constraints facing the organization, and, when possible, organizational change. Although 
I do not present extensive material from these interviews in the empirical chapters that 
follow, the information obtained in these interviews reinforced patterns observed in 
organizational and congressional documents.8 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
My primary analytic approach for detailing the construction and maintenance of 
organizational legitimacy is to examine sentiments expressed in organizational narratives 
and congressional discourse. As a government agency, the Peace Corps must work with 
Congress each year to obtain appropriations. In doing so, the agency submits to Congress 
an annual budget justification that outlines it accomplishments and intentions for the 
coming fiscal year. The budget authorization process plays out in subcommittee hearings 
and through written exchanges between the agency and members of Congress. Agency 
representatives and various witnesses are called before relevant subcommittees to present 
testimony and answer questions posed by committee members. The subcommittee then 
makes a recommendation to the larger body, which is discussed, debated, and voted on 
by the full House or Senate.  
                                                 
8 It should also be noted that I served as a Peace Corps volunteer from 1998-2001 in the Pacific island 
nation of Vanuatu. My role as a Peace Corps volunteer was to develop local capacity in vocational 
educational, with the aim of providing applied training and credentials to school-leaving youth. The over-
arching aim of my assignment in Vanuatu was to foster vocational and small-business skills among school-
leavers that could be used at the village level and, as a consequence, stem the drift of disaffected youth with 
marginal levels of education from moving to urban centers.  
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 During subcommittee testimony, Peace Corps representatives try to convince 
members of congress to authorize and, later, appropriate the operating funds requested by 
the agency. Typically, the agency testifies regarding the activities and accomplishments 
of the agency and provides information regarding the intentions of the agency in the 
coming year. In addition, agency representatives respond to questions posed by 
committee members during testimony and are typically asked to submit written responses 
to questions raised subsequent to hearings. All of this material is archived in the 
Congressional Record. 
Congressional hearings, budget justifications, and agency documents represent 
direct indictors of the policy discourses used by Congress and the Peace Corps and are an 
ideal analytic window into legitimacy processes. Indeed, Jacobs and Sobieraj (2007), in 
their recent narrative analysis of U.S. Congressional debate concerning legitimacy in the 
nonprofit sector, note that “for any given narrative, it is possible to investigate the 
pragmatic goals the narrator is pursuing, the institutional context in which the story is 
being told, and the narrative conventions that regulate the talk or writing taking place 
within that specific institutional context” (p. 6).9 Here, I use a set of four specific 
                                                 
9 Jacobs and Sobieraj (2007) also address an important point regarding institutional factors that influence 
the production of narratives in congressional policy debates: “While the debates originate as spoken 
discourse, arguments unfold with the recognition that they will appear in written form, in the Congressional 
Record. In addition, congressional speakers have the opportunity to supplement the written record of their 
speeches by inserting various written documents into the records. While the potential audience of these 
speeches and documents is the American public, most narratives are told under the assumption that other 
politicians and their aides, as well as specific constituents and interest groups, will consume them in the 
short term. This gives the congressional speeches a dual quality. On the one hand, because the debates are 
organized around the central topic of tax policy, the speeches are made in order to support or reject specific 
tax policies, and tend to refer to nonprofit organizations in terms of how much money they will cost (or 
save) the Treasury if specific proposals are passed. On the other hand, politicians make their speeches in 
full recognition that they are participating in the creation of a jointly authored text that will serve as a 
multivalent document: a policy document for politicians and their aides; a political document for their 
constituents, their political allies and opponents, and other interest groups; and a historical document for 
students of politics and political culture” (p. 6). While their example pertains to tax policy for the nonprofit 
sector, it could easily be applied to debates concerning foreign policy and international development aid.   
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questions concerning fundamentals of international development as focal points for 
examining organizational narratives and congressional discourse.10 The four focal areas 
include: (1) the conceptualization of rationales for action – What motivates the 
organization?; (2) the construction of understandings about development problems – Why 
are organization’s services needed?; (3) the construction of solutions to development 
problems – How should the organization respond to perceived needs?; and (4) how 
project failures and successes are monitored, reported, and explained – How does the 
organization make sense of outcomes?  In my analysis of documents and the various 
voices represented, I paid particular attention to congruence, contestations and tensions, 
and silences regarding these focal areas. Moreover, particular attention was given to 
contrasts concerning how concepts such as development, modernization, and progress 
were constructed and reconstructed over time. 
The project also seeks to address an unresolved question in historical research on 
the Peace Corps, and international development organizations generally, which pertains 
to the explanatory power of different periodizations scholars use to explain change in 
development organizations over time. The thirty-five year period under investigation is 
selected because it centers on phases of escalation and de-escalation in the Cold War—a 
period in which foreign assistance was viewed as a central tool of U.S. foreign policy. 
The time frame also spans five presidential administrations, two of which occur during 
and three that follow the Cold War. Finally, the temporal starting point for my analysis, 
the start of the Carter administration in 1977, is significant because it marks a point at 
which the Peace Corps is facing a crisis of legitimacy and an uncertain future. 
                                                 
10 Riessman (1990) explains that, unlike traditional discourse analysis, narrative analysis “identifies longer 
stretches of talk that take the form of narrative—a discourse organized around time and consequential 
events in the world created by the narrator” (p. 1195). 
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To address the issues of periodization and how boundaries of time periods are 
constructed, my research design draws on the historical-comparative methodological 
strategy of reiterated problem solving, which attends to both the historical details of cases 
and the cumulative effect organizational decisions have on later events (Haydu 1998). In 
this conceptualization, different periods constitute different cases. Haydu (1998) argues 
that the central puzzle in historical research that spans time periods is to explain how 
actors (e.g., individuals, organizations, etc.) solved similar problems in different periods. 
This approach entails investigating “contrasts in how social actors constructed the 
problem[s] and what solutions appeared to be realistic within each historical context” (p. 
33).  Here, the central problems are organizational persistence and the maintenance of 
legitimacy over time.   
 
Limitations and Constraints 
 As with any study, there are elements of the research design and data-orientated 
challenges that impact research findings. The data used in this dissertation reflect the 
public face of Congress and the Peace Corps. In writing annual reports or presenting 
information in congressional hearings, individuals and organizations are, perhaps, more 
mindful of the words used and messages sent. Budget justifications, for example, are 
strategic documents by definition. That is, the intent of such documents is to make a case 
to an audience, here Congress, that past activities, current performance, and future plans 
for the organization are legitimate and worthy of support. This is not a problem given the 
ways in which ideas and arguments are articulated and presented to constituents is a key 
focal point of this project. What is not reflected in the data and analysis, however, are the 
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many internal conversations and debates that likely occur among members of Congress 
and the private discussions among administrators at Peace Corps headquarters.  
 It should be noted, however, that at the outset of the study, I made a substantial 
effort to obtain internal organizational documents, including materials such as committee 
minutes, internal assessment reports, and planning documents. After a meeting with the 
current Peace Corps records manager, I learned that internal documents for the years 
under study were not yet processed or catalogued for placement in the National Archives 
and would not be for many years to come. In short, the bureaucratic hurdles to obtaining 
access to contemporary internal organizational documents were insurmountable given the 
time and resource constraints of this project.  
 Although the findings presented below are derived from multiple and extensive 
data sources, it should also be noted that a common critique of discursive and narrative 
analyses of social phenomena is that it is an inherently interpretive endeavor. As such, it 
is important to recognize the possibility of alternative interpretations (Phillips and Hardy 
2002). However, the objective, as Brown (2000:55) notes, is not “a quest for ultimate 
truth, but for a plausible, authoritative, and interesting analysis that enriches our 
understanding of social phenomena” (quoted in Golant and Sillince 2007:1155). Finally, 
case study research is sometimes critiqued as a method, in particular, for its inability to 
provide a basis for scientific generalization (Yin 2013). The aim of this dissertation, 
however, is not of generalization to a population, but to theoretical propositions wherein 
the overarching goals are to better understand social processes and to expand and 
generalize theories (Sayer 1992).  
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Setting Up the Case: A Brief Introduction to the U.S. Peace Corps 
On March 1, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the Peace Corps by 
executive order.  The order was authorized by Congress on September 22, 1961, with 
passage of the Peace Corps Act (Public Law 87-293). The broad aim of the Peace Corps 
Act, as articulated in its Declaration of Purpose was “to promote world peace and 
friendship” through the realization of three goals. First, the Act sought to “provide for a 
Peace Corps to help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs 
for skilled manpower.” This objective, commonly referred to as the Peace Corps’ “First 
Goal” pertains to the provision of development assistance. The second objective of the 
Peace Corps Act was the promotion of “a better understanding of the American people on 
the part of peoples served.” The so-called “Second Goal” charges the agency with 
advancing public diplomacy and cultural exchange abroad. The final objective sought to 
advance “a better understanding of other peoples on the part of the American people.” 
The aim of the agency’s “Third Goal,” thus, is to encourage volunteers upon their return 
to the United States to engage in cultural exchange at home by sharing their experiences 
with others.11  
The Peace Corps is an independent U.S. government agency that has, since its 
establishment in 1961, sent over 210,000 volunteers to work in 139 countries around the 
world. Appendix A includes a list all countries where volunteers have worked. The 
agency currently works in 76 countries. Volunteers service terms last 27 months, which 
includes approximately three months of language, culture, and technical training. In total, 
volunteers have provided over 475,000 thousand years of volunteer development 
                                                 
11 Throughout the dissertation, I will refer to these organizational goals in both numeric (i.e., first, second, 
third) and substantive (i.e., development assistance, public diplomacy, and cultural exchange) format. 
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assistance to date. The bulk of this work has occurred in rural communities throughout 
the developing world. Indeed, Peace Corps volunteers are often the only Western 
development workers that work in remote locations for an extended period of time. 
Below is a current breakdown of volunteers by region (Justification 2013). 
 
 







Volunteers work in a range of development sectors, including: education, health, 
community economic development, environment, youth in development, and agriculture. 
Typically, volunteers work directly with communities, schools, local governments, non-
governmental organizations, and small businesses. Below is a current breakdown of 
volunteers by development sector (Justification 2013): 
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My examination of the Peace Corps picks up in 1977 with the start of the Carter 
administration. At this point, the agency is facing a crisis of legitimacy and an uncertain 
future. It is well documented that the Nixon and Ford administrations nearly killed the 
agency, taking away its autonomy by placing it in the federal umbrella agency ACTION 
and by sharply cutting its budget. Bolstered by opponents of the Peace Corps in 
Congress, the Nixon and Ford administrations severely defunded and, by most accounts, 
demoralized the agency. Historians point to a variety of explanations for the Nixon 
administration’s disdain for the agency, ranging from its association with President 
Kennedy, who was Nixon’s formal political rival, to perceptions of the organization as a 
liberal bastion and haven for critics of the Vietnam War (Meisler 2011). The historical 
record shows that Nixon ordered the dismantling of the organization through budget 
reductions and a stripping away of the organization’s autonomy by placing under the 
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umbrella agency ACTION (Meisler 2011). When Carter assumes the presidency, there is 
an open question as to what will happen to the Peace Corps—the agency could die or it 
could be resurrected. In short, the Peace Corps is at a point where it has to clarify and 
legitimate its purpose and build support for the agency among the administration, 
members of Congress, and the public. It is at this historical juncture where my analysis 
begins. 








“The moral purpose that guides the United States in its foreign affairs has been given a 
new dimension – The Peace Corps”  
 
      Peace Corps News (June 1961) 
 
 
“Peace Corps has enabled thousands of Americans to help people all over the world 
become what they ought to be, and has brought the message by their very lives that 
America is a great country that stands for good values and human progress.” 
  
      President Bill Clinton (1994) 
 
 
“The Peace Corps is far more than the sum total of the Volunteers’ individual projects. It 
stands for something special. It is a non-traditional government agency that reflects the 
most enduring values and ideals of the American people: generosity, civic pride, a strong 
work ethic, and a commitment to service.” 
  






At its inception, the Peace Corps was portrayed as a virtuous organization, 
comprised of dedicated Americans committed to bettering the world through the spread 
of modern values. As the idea for the Peace Corps transitioned into a practical reality, 
agency administrators needed to achieve two objectives to establish the organization’s 
legitimacy. First, the Peace Corps needed members of Congress to believe in the 
agency’s mission. That is, to be seen as worthwhile and worthy of appropriations, 
relevant stakeholders needed to buy into the aims and objectives of the organization. 
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Second, the agency needed to be viewed as an entity qualified and capable of undertaking 
its congressionally mandated responsibilities of international development assistance and 
public diplomacy abroad. In the sphere of politics, such objectives are not easily achieved 
and, perhaps, even harder to maintain over time. Yet, fifty-three years after the Peace 
Corps’ founding, the agency is still sending thousands of volunteers abroad annually to 
work in a wide range of development sectors.  
President Clinton’s comment above speaks to this achievement and provides a 
window into the beliefs—expressed in similar ways by nearly every president, senator, 
and representative since John F. Kennedy first established the organization in 1961—that 
undergird valuations of the agency. Although every president and member of congress 
may have differing views on what specific activities and programmatic foci the agency 
should emphasize, there is surprising unanimity over time in how the Peace Corps and 
the work of its volunteers are broadly framed in congressional discourse and 
organizational narratives. This chapter seeks to better understand the construction of 
organizational legitimacy by addressing the following questions: To what extent is the 
legitimacy of the Peace Corps based on shared understandings and assumptions among 
the agency administrators and members of Congress? What is the nature of these 
understandings and assumptions? How do they change over time? 
As noted, the Congressional Record is replete with positive appraisals of the 
Peace Corps. Indeed, throughout my reading of congressional hearings, testimony, and 
agency documents, it became clear that there is a set of shared implicit assumptions about 
the “goodness” of development and the benevolence of the United States and its citizens, 
especially those who volunteer, that serve to legitimize the agency and its activities. I 
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proceed by considering how the symbolism surrounding President Kennedy’s 
establishment of the Peace Corps serves as an anchor point for narratives about the 
organization. I then show how members of Congress and the agency construct powerful 
narratives that portray the United States and the Peace Corps as benevolent actors and 
Peace Corps volunteers as selfless, virtuous development workers. Next, I provide a brief 
discussion of how the organization, in concert with Congress, narratively construct 
individuals, communities, and countries abroad as legitimate objects of action. I conclude 
by arguing that the positive shared assumptions regarding development, in general, and 
the Peace Corps, specifically, expressed in congressional discourse and organizational 
narratives establishes a reservoir of legitimacy for the agency that it can draw on as it 
confronts legitimacy challenges over time.  
 
 
Establishing a Founding Narrative: The Birth of the Peace Corps 
 
The first debates in the United States Congress concerning the establishment of an 
international development agency staffed by volunteer citizens occurred as a part of a 
larger discussion concerning U.S. strategies to combat communism. Building on 
Truman’s famous call for greater U.S. development intervention abroad, Representative 
Henry Reuss (D-WI) introduced a bill to the House of Representatives in January 1960 
seeking funding for a feasibility study to establish a U.S. international volunteer agency 
called the Point Four Youth Corps. Reuss’ bill was later added to a much larger foreign 
policy bill titled the Mutual Security Act of 1960 that sought to protect U.S. national 
interests abroad. Building on prevailing congressional Cold War narratives concerning 
the threat of communism, Representative Robert Chiperfield of Illinois (R) described the 
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general intent of the Mutual Security Act on the floor of the House this way: “Wholly 
aside from humanitarian and altruistic motives, the main purpose of the mutual security 
bill is through military and economic aid to maintain the security of the United States and 
the free world from Communist aggression and thereby maintain the peace” (quoted in 
Rice 1985:257). Although a relatively small component of the larger bill, the Point Four 
Youth Corps was portrayed as a potentially effective tool in the battle of ideas with the 
Soviet Union.  
Around the same time the Mutual Security Act was being ushered through the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) introduced a bill to 
the Senate calling for the creation of a “Peace Corps,” comprised of skilled U.S. citizens 
that would send “young men to assist the peoples of the underdeveloped areas of the 
world to combat poverty, disease, illiteracy, and hunger” (Senate S. 3675).12  
Humphrey’s proposal aligned with the general ideas of Reuss’ Youth Corps. However, 
while Humphrey’s comments on the bill shared some of the concerns regarding the 
spread of communism in the non-aligned states that was at the center of the Mutual 
Security Act, the Senator placed greater emphasis in his remarks on the potential 
transformative effects of American idealism and values abroad. Although it was Senator 
Humphrey who campaigned on the Peace Corps proposal during his 1960 run for 
president, it was the Democratic presidential nominee that beat him, Senator John F. 
Kennedy, who would ultimately make the idea of establishing the U.S. Peace Corps a 
reality.  
In a storied 2:00 a.m. speech at the University of Michigan in October 1960, 
Senator Kennedy asked the approximately 10,000 students present: “How many of you, 
                                                 
12 Senator Humphrey first introduced a version of this bill in 1957.  
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who are going to be doctors, are willing to spend your days in Ghana? Technicians or 
engineers, how many of you are willing to work in the Foreign Service and spend your 
lives traveling around the world?”13 Kennedy’s impassioned impromptu speech that early 
morning in Michigan caught the attention of and enthused many young voters and, 
consequently, his campaign staff. With the support of his former campaign rival, 
Kennedy decided to adopt Humphrey’s idea for the establishment of a volunteer corps 
and made it a point of emphasis in the final weeks of his campaign against Republican 
Richard Nixon.  
Two weeks following the University of Michigan speech and six days prior to the 
election, Senator Kennedy gave a high-profile foreign policy speech in San Francisco 
covering a wide range of issues. In the speech, Kennedy lamented that the Soviet Union 
and China had “hundreds of men and women, scientists, physicists, teachers, engineers, 
doctors, [and] nurses…prepared to spend their lives abroad in the service of world 
communism” (Kennedy 1960, quoted in Meisler 2011). Kennedy asserted that the United 
States needed to respond to this effort by the communists by sending “ambassadors of 
peace” throughout the world. He argued:  
 
I therefore propose that our inadequate efforts in this area be supplemented by a 
peace corps of talented young men and women, willing and able to serve their 
country in this fashion for three years as an alternative or as a supplement to 
peacetime selective service, well qualified through rigorous standards, well 
trained in the languages, skills, and customs they will need to know (Kennedy 
1960, quoted in Meisler 2011). 
 
The speech in San Francisco was the first time Kennedy formally proposed the 
formation of a citizen volunteer development agency called the Peace Corps. Soon after 
he won the presidency, Kennedy asked his staff to begin developing plans for the new 
                                                 
13 Source: Peace Corps (http://www.peacecorps.gov/about/history/speech/) 
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agency and on March 1, 1961, President Kennedy established the Peace Corps by 
executive order. When Kennedy signed the order, he, like Humphrey, deemphasized the 
role of the Peace Corps in fighting communism. Indeed, at a news conference 
immediately following the signing, Kennedy asserted, “Our Peace Corps is not designed 
as an instrument of diplomacy or propaganda or ideological conflict. It is designed to 
permit our people to exercise more fully their responsibilities in the great common cause 
of world development.14” Just six months later, on September 22, 1961, Kennedy’s 
executive order was authorized by Congress with the passage of the Peace Corps Act 
(Public Law 87-293), thus cementing Peace Corps’ place in the U.S. foreign policy 
apparatus. Although the agency’s focus on communism remained central to 
administrative planning and programming in the early years of the Peace Corps (Latham 
2000), public perceptions of the Peace Corps centered on notions of charity, sacrifice, and 
altruism. President Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 only served to bolster 
these perceptions. Indeed, the Peace Corps became a powerful symbol of Kennedy’s 
legacy, held up to this day by many as one of his greatest singular accomplishments as 
president.  
As will be discussed below, the salience of the Peace Corps’ origins story is 
evident in contemporary congressional discourse and organizational narratives. Indeed, 
nearly every congressional hearing concerning the Peace Corps over the period under 
study begins with the chair and members of the subcommittee proclaiming their 
admiration for the agency and Peace Corps volunteers, typically offering some variant of 
the sentiment that the agency and volunteers stand for “what is best about America.”  
                                                 
14 Source: National Archives (http://blogs.archives.gov/prologue/?p=1776)  
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Members of congress frequently refer to John F. Kennedy and his late night 
Michigan speech in ways that present the birth of the organization as a sacred event in the 
history of the United States.15 Kennedy’s intentions for the Peace Corps are imagined as 
an altruistic effort on the part of the American people to advance global progress and 
world peace. Often, the Peace Corps founding narrative is used in congressional 
discourse and organizational narratives as a preemptive mechanism to diffuse potential 
inter-party disagreements over the aims and activities of the organization, thus 
establishing a “common ground” for proceeding with testimony. During congressional 
hearings to discuss appropriations for the Peace Corps in 2002, for example, Senator 
Chris Dodd (D-CT) began by relaying the Peace Corps origins story for the record. He 
then went on to note that, according to Kennedy, the agency and its volunteers were not 
meant to reflect “particular Republican or Democratic ideologies,” but “American values, 
values held in common by all of us as American citizens…to support the development 
and betterment of the countries and communities where the Peace Corps volunteers 
[serve]” (Hearing 2002:2).  
In repeatedly retelling or referencing the Peace Corps founding story and by 
invoking President Kennedy’s memory, especially his charisma and altruistic intentions 
for world peace, members of Congress and the agency invoke a kind personal, as well as 
moral, legitimacy that fosters positive valuations of the organization. In short, if the 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that perceptions of the Peace Corps were less favorable among conservative politicians 
in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. The biggest critiques pertained to perceptions about the agency 
as a haven for individuals who did not support the Vietnam War. Indeed, there were several known 
instances where Peace Corps volunteers published articles in local newspapers abroad that spoke negatively 
about U.S. foreign policy and the Vietnam War. Perhaps the most contentious event was when a group of 
returned volunteers took over a floor at Peace Corps headquarters in Washington D.C. in 1971 and hung a 
homemade Viet Cong flag out a fourth floor window in protest of the war in Vietnam. The incident 
received significant attention in the U.S. press and solidified the distaste of the Nixon administration and 
several congressional members for the agency. 
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founding ideals and intentions of the agency are considered and treated as a sacred 
element of the American character, questioning the agency is tantamount to questioning 
the nation itself. It is to the narrative and discursive construction of this national sense of 
self that I now turn.   
 
For a Greater Good: The Benevolence of the United States and its Citizens 
 
 We begin to see in the Peace Corps origins story above attempts by the Kennedy 
administration to construct and maintain legitimacy for the Peace Corps based on 
allusions to the uniqueness of the United States and the moral character of its citizens.  
At the center of the Peace Corps’ founding narrative was a shared belief in the promise 
and potential of American values to save the world. The government’s strategic interests 
in combating communism were imbued with moral justifications that constructed the 
United States as a righteous actor on the global stage. Interventions in the lives of 
individuals, communities, and countries abroad rested on the presumption that the United 
States had material goods, technology, and ideas that recipient countries did not possess 
but needed in order to advance. In short, the framing of U.S. development interventions 
abroad rested heavily on ideas regarding the moral imperative to help others in the 
service of advancing progress and modernization. 
Of course, presenting one’s activities as being in the service of a broader moral 
imperative is not unique to the Peace Corps. Indeed, development interventions are often 
portrayed in a way that frames the intervener in a good light. Work by religious missions, 
for example, has long been legitimized on the basis that missionaries have a moral 
obligation to alleviate both material and spiritual poverty. Interventions by international 
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organizations such as Care or Save the Children are typically framed as humanitarian 
endeavors meant to bring about positive change for individuals and communities. And 
international organizations such as the World Bank and UNICEF also rely on narratives 
concerning the positive transformative nature of their work. 
To be sure, there are critics of each of the abovementioned entities and the 
development project broadly, yet, in most instances, international organizations are able 
to maintain the perception that they are “doing good” in the world. Some argue that 
development organizations, especially significant players such as the World Bank, are 
able to use their dominant positions in the field to manufacture positive perceptions 
because of their ability to control the sense-making and evaluation of their activities 
(Goldman 2005). Others argue that positive evaluations of development organizations are 
based on superficial assessments that rely on a logic of confidence (Meyer and Rowan 
1977). That is, development organizations are deemed legitimate because they appear to 
the external environment as though they are engaged in legitimate development activity. 
A third perspective suggests that development organizations are able to maintain positive 
perceptions because development and modernization, as abstract ideas, are undergirded 
by a religious-like faith on the part of development practitioners, the public, and 
recipients alike that serves to buffer development organizations from closer scrutiny and 
clouds evaluations of development activity (Rist 1997). As will become clear in 
subsequent chapters, the Peace Corps’ ability to gain and maintain legitimacy rests on a 
combination of the perspectives above.  
At the time of the Peace Corps founding, modernization theory enjoyed 
widespread legitimacy as the theory of development and was advanced as an anecdote to 
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the spread of communism. If the West, led by the United States, could incorporate the 
peoples of the world into a system that valued participatory democracy and free-market 
economics, then communities would be transformed, nations would evolve, and the 
people of the world would be on track to realize their fullest potential. Moreover, the 
United States would have won the war of ideas with the Soviet Union. The ideology of 
modernization was, according to Latham (2000), so thoroughly engrained in U.S. culture 
that “the United States was called to drive other societies toward a modernity most 
clearly embodied by America itself” (p. 111). The Peace Corps, USAID, and other 
components of the foreign policy apparatus established in the 1960s were intended to be 
tangible manifestations of this ideology. 
While agencies such as USAID were engaged in macro-level planning and 
programming aimed at transforming entire economies, the Peace Corps was envisaged as 
a development tool for grassroots transformation. From the beginning, the agency 
presented itself as a unique and special element of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. The 
Peace Corps’ distinction was in its attempt to affect change through long-term, people-to-
people development activity. Indeed, in its Second Annual Report to Congress, the 
agency argued that by its very presence in “Third World” countries, the Peace Corps 
would “awaken people to the possibilities of progress” (Justification 1962:39). The Peace 
Corps model sought to facilitate this awakening through development programming that 
relied on what the agency, historically, and Peace Corps Directors throughout the period 
under study, referred to as a “self-help” philosophy. This model places a great deal of 
emphasis on cultural modernization through demonstration. In short, volunteers transmit 
the “American way of life” in the work that they do and the way they live—the attributes 
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of which are fundamentally understood to be precursors of modernization and 
prerequisites for development. The minutes from an early agency meeting clearly capture 
a key assumption that undergirded the initial Peace Corps model. In describing the aims 
of the agency and its potential implications for societies abroad, administrators spoke of 
Peace Corps volunteers as “free men and women, the products of a free society sent 
abroad to serve and do their assigned work with such dedication that their hosts will, by 
this example, be brought to reflection on the nature of the society that produced them” 
(Latham 2000:109). Such statements reflect an extraordinary belief in the American 
character and its transformative power. Perhaps even more remarkable is the salience of 
these types of assertions over the life of the Peace Corps. 
It became clear in my analysis that one could pick up the transcript from any 
congressional hearing on the Peace Corps or any budget justification from the late 1970s 
through the 2010s and find similar assertions concerning the promise of modernization as 
exemplified by the demonstration of American values. How do we end poverty? How do 
we spread democracy? How do we foster the entrepreneurial spirit? How do we protect 
the environment? How do we stop the spread of AIDS? Fundamentally, the Peace Corps’ 
answer to these questions is to fix development problems through the transference of 
American culture—knowledge, technology, techniques, dispositions, and attitudes.  
At the center of descriptions of this process are allusions to the compassion of the 
American people. Moreover, organizational narratives present the Peace Corps as an 
essential expression of American values. For example, in its budget justifications and 
testimony the agency repeatedly makes the argument that the Peace Corps reflects the 
“most enduring values and ideals of the American people” (Justification 2000:5). The 
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agency consistently describes itself as having a “large and noble purpose” that embodies 
and transmits to those abroad values such as optimism, freedom, opportunity, service, 
altruism, generosity, civic pride, and a strong work ethic (Justification 1998). In a 
statement that is typical of Peace Corps directors and one that clearly illustrates the 
coupling of American values with the presumption of positive development outcomes, 
the Reagan-appointed director, Loret Miller Ruppe, asserted to members of Congress in 
the organization’s 1980 budget request that the agency’s “unselfish attitude of helping 
others is ingrained in the American structure and serves as a potent force to address many 
of the social and economic problems in the United States and the World” (Justification 
1980:1). 16  
The sentiments expressed in organizational narratives above are persuasive and 
effective, in part, because they align with the normative vision of members of Congress. 
Indeed, the effusive language used by Peace Corps administrators is equally matched by 
members of Congress from all parties. In a similar way that members of Congress 
consistently refer to the organization’s founding narrative when framing discussions of 
the agency, members are outward in their praise for the agency. For example, during 
recent congressional hearings, conservative Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) began his 
testimony by plainly asserting, “I am a believer in the Peace Corps. I am a believer in that 
Americans engaged internationally is a positive for our country, positive for our future, 
and positive for the world” (Hearing 2011:20). During the same hearing, Senator Robert 
Menendez (D-NJ) remarked: 
                                                 
16 Another example comes from the testimony of Peace Corps Director Paul Coverdell. In describing the 
triumph of American values in the Cold War, the director asserted: “How ironic it is that the Peace Corps 
and the Berlin Wall were products of the same era, and yet the wall is now being packaged in small 
fragments for sale in American department stores while the Peace Corps is stronger and richer than ever 
and is serving in more countries than at any time in our history” (Hearing 1990:23). 
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When John F. Kennedy created the Peace Corps, he saw it as more than a quixotic 
agency of young people on a mission of peace. He saw it as a fulfillment, a 
fundamental fulfillment of our values as a nation. He sought to encourage a better 
understanding between Americans from every walk of life and the people and 
cultures of other nations. [Our] late friend and colleague Ted Kennedy always 
used to say. “It is always better to send in the Peace Corps than the Marine 
Corps.” Sending in the Marines, albeit necessary on occasion, is never a 
welcomed option. But sending in the Peace Corps is always a welcomed 
opportunity for us to extend the hand of freedom and democracy around the world 
and to show the world the power of our values rather than the value of our power 
(Hearing 2011:2). 
 
In sum, we see in congressional discourse and organizational narratives a 
consistency over time in the belief that the Peace Corps is a legitimate embodiment of 
American values. Moreover, the Peace Corps is understood by the organization and 
members of Congress as a force of good in the world. This narrative construction, which 
I will call the benevolence narrative, has powerful path-dependent consequences. In later 
chapters, I will show how the shared positive assumptions associated with this narrative 
are used as a lens to assess and evaluate the work of the Peace Corps. Next, however, I 
consider how the benevolence narrative is manifest in discussions of the Peace Corps 
volunteers themselves.  
 
 
Missionaries of Modernization: The Self-Sacrificing Volunteer 
 
As noted, general sentiments regarding the exceptional nature of American 
culture and values, and its potential to transform individuals and communities abroad, 
permeate congressional discourse and organizational narratives. The United States and its 
citizens are presented as a generous and giving people. This finding on its own is 
important for understanding how development interventions abroad are legitimized and 
justified. Yet there is another dimension to this story. 
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There is perhaps no clearer distillation of the benevolence narrative than in 
discussions of the Peace Corps volunteers themselves. In much the same way that 
religious missionaries are portrayed as selfless individuals “spreading the good news” of 
the gospel, Peace Corps volunteers are portrayed as self-sacrificing agents of change 
who, in the service of progress, are catalysts for modernization. In making a point 
regarding the widespread praise for the Peace Corps and its volunteers abroad, Director 
Gaddi Vasquez (2002) quoted17 the President of Kiribati, Mr. Teburoro Tito, during 
congressional testimony as saying, “This Republic is in love with the Peace Corps. We 
are in love with them, with their goals, their hard work, and their willingness to live like 
us” (Hearing 2002:8). This quote is important because it captures the simple, yet 
powerful way in which the organization consistently presents its volunteers as selfless 
development workers. The 1998 budget justification notes, for example, that volunteers 
“share a common spirit of service, dedication, and idealism. For two years, they pursue a 
life that requires determination, self-motivation, patience, and sacrifice” (Justification 
1998:1). This is a narrative that imbues volunteers and the organization with meaning 
similar to the ways in which U.S. soldiers, despite being engaged in activities very 
different from Peace Corps volunteers, are cloaked with a sense of honor.18 In this 
formulation, Peace Corps volunteers are not only representing American values, but they 
are doing so in such a way that involves great hardship. This framing reinforces the idea 
that volunteers and, by extension, the Peace Corps is simply trying to “do good” 
throughout the world. In their “willingness to live like us,” to speak the same language, to 
                                                 
17 Quoting the leaders of recipient nations is a common strategy Peace Corps directors use during testimony 
to make the case that the Peace Corps is loved around the world.  
18 This is akin to way the public or members of Congress can be against the war in Iraq, for example, but 
not against the soldiers fighting the war. Of course, war-making and international development are not 
moral equivalents, but the same types of legitimacy processes are at play.  
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share in cultural exchange, to eat the same foods, and to work in remote locations, Peace 
Corps volunteers transform individuals and communities that are cut-off from the 
benefits of modern life into something more, something better. In short, volunteers are 
helping people at the grassroots overcome the cultural traditions and practices that 
impede their progress.  
We are led to see Peace Corps volunteers as catalysts of change, as a means for 
spreading a vision for a better tomorrow to the hinterland, and as an effective tool for 
“making men modern.” Organizational narratives and congressional discourse are full of 
references to the “good work” of volunteers and the positive impacts they can have on the 
dispositions of people at the grassroots. In each instance, Peace Corps volunteers are 
depicted as mechanisms through which forward-thinking dispositions can be transmitted. 
In the 1977 budget justification, for example, the agency quotes a volunteer serving in 
Nepal who makes the case that the introduction of material and nonmaterial technologies 
by Peace Corps volunteers is essential because villagers may “lack the conceptual kind of 
thinking that makes a departure from tradition possible” (Justification 1977:11). In 1979, 
the agency charges the volunteers with “encouraging individual responsibility” and 
“fostering self-reliance” among those served (Justification 1979:1). The 1982 justification 
makes reference to the essential, but “elusive,” aspects of development that volunteers 
advance, including: “raising the consciousness of local people, providing a practical 
orientation, fostering problem-solving, stimulating ideas, and motivating communities” 
(Justification 1982:4). In 1985, volunteers are said to be engaged in “motivation 
development” that will “instill confidence and the concept of self-sufficiency” in those 
served abroad (Justification 1985:17). Striking an even more explicitly patronizing tone, 
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the 1998 justification frames the work of volunteers as helping transform mindsets to 
allow people to “expand their horizons,” “lead fuller lives,” and “assume more 
responsibility” for their future (p. 2). In short, as effective “role models of attitudes and 
possibilities,” Peace Corps volunteers are a force for positive change (Justification 
2001:6).  
Such explicit allusions to progress through the transformation of dispositions is 
reminiscent of models used by religious missionaries. In effect, volunteers are spreading 
the “religion of modernization” (Rist 1997). By engaging in a sort of “lifestyle 
evangelism,” Peace Corps volunteers will not only win the trust of the locals, but also 
accelerate the process of modernization. This notion, that by the example of their 
lifestyle, volunteers can transform entire communities demonstrates a remarkable 
confidence in the righteousness of American ideals. This repeatedly expressed belief in 
the “goodness” of the endeavor, coupled with notions of self-sacrifice on the part of 
volunteers, is an important lens through which the activities of the organization are 
understood and evaluated. That is, if one believes so fully in the virtue of Peace Corps 
volunteers and the mission of the organization, it becomes difficult to critique the agency. 
Instead, we are left with the general sentiment that any development is better than no 
development. This sentiment, if taken seriously, is a powerful window into sensemaking 
about organizational activities. In sum, the totality of positive valuations of the aims of 
the Peace Corps and the volunteers serve as a reservoir of legitimacy that, as I will 
demonstrate in Chapter Five, buffers the agency from close scrutiny. First, however, I 
turn to a brief discussion of how the agency constructs its objects of development.  
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The Narrative Construction of the Development Recipient  
In addition to the ideological underpinnings that animate the Peace Corps, the 
organization also legitimizes its activities through narrative descriptions of country 
conditions that highlight desperate situations throughout the world. This task is achieved 
primarily in the annual budget justification country and regional summaries. Regional 
overviews include summative statements about the state of affairs in a given region 
regarding levels of poverty and development needs. In addition, the agency provides 
information regarding sector activity in each region. Perhaps most notable is the way in 
which descriptions paint a disastrous and perilous picture of life in developing countries. 
An example from the 1983 budget justification captures this sentiment well. The agency 
writes: 
The most simple survey of global conditions demonstrates that the potential, and 
the need, for Peace Corps assistance remains enormous. Climbing fuel prices have 
impaired development, and have contributed to economic instability in developing 
nations. The conundrum of overpopulation, malnutrition, and eroding natural 
resources has resulted in increased starvation and disease, declining forests, and 
expanding deserts. For the poorest of the world’s poor, living is a constant 
struggle for survival. Unfortunately, most major studies predict that these 
problems and the toll of human suffering will worsen rather than abate in the near 
future” (Justification 1983:3). 
 
Such dramatic depictions are followed immediately by explanations for the ways 
in which the Peace Corps is particularly suited to address such problems, with the agency 
asserting on an annual basis that the “need for the Peace Corps has never been greater.” 
An additional element in the narrative construction of the development recipient 
is the ways in which the agency draws on dominant development foci in legitimating its 
planning and programming. For example, we see this with the adoption of a Basic Human 
Needs (BHN) approach to development by the agency in the 1970s. A key metric that is 
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used to justify country presence during this period is the Physical Quality of Life Index 
(PQLI), a standardized and widely used human development index measured by national 
literacy levels, infant mortality rates, and life expectancy rates. During the Carter 
administration, an amendment was added to the Peace Corps Act to reflect the agency’s 
concern with basic needs of the poorest of the poor. Language was added to mandate that 
all development work done by the Peace Corps should focus “particularly on meeting the 
basic needs of those living in the poorest areas of such countries” (Public Law 95-331). 
In 1978, Congress also amended the Peace Corps Act to add a mandated agency focus on 
Women in Development (WID). And in 1981, the Act was amended with similar 
language focusing on the inclusion of “disabled people” in development.  
Just two years later, in a fairly dramatic shift, Director Loret Ruppe provided a 
reassessment and reframing in how the agency talked about the individuals, communities, 
and countries it served, referring to them as potential consumers of American products 
and exporters of raw materials desired by U.S. companies. In the FY 1983 transmittal 
letter to Congress, the Director asserted: “Since the Peace Corps was founded twenty 
years ago, we have witnessed a profound change in our relationship with the developing 
world. Developing nations now represent the fastest growing customers of U.S. exports 
and have by far the greatest potential for further growth. We have become more 
dependent on developing nations for our essential raw materials” (Justification 1983:1). 
In this period, language regarding agency programming shifted away from the basic 
human needs discourses of the early 1980s toward an emphasis on programming in small 
business and the spread of democracy. By the 1990s the agency shifted once again when 
it began to emphasize programming focused on the environment and sustainability. At 
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present, the agency works with individuals and communities in diverse contexts and 
emphasizes development work in a range of development sectors, including: education, 
health, community economic development, environment, youth in development, and 
agriculture. Consistent throughout the programming changes detailed above has been the 
delivery method—person-to-person development—a hallmark of the Peace Corps 





Chapter Three sought to unpack the legitimating narratives that emerged at the 
time of the Peace Corps’ founding as well as their lasting effects. These narratives 
represented the organization’s presentation of self in a Goffmanian sense, and were 
clearly linked to the agency’s emergence and success. Indeed, the rise of the Peace Corps 
in the 1960s was a triumph of a belief in the promise of modernization as an ideology and 
development as an instrument to bring about social, political, and economic change. The 
work of the Peace Corps, as set in motion by President Kennedy, was rooted in a myth 
that constructed the organization and its volunteers as guardians of the moral cause of 
development. That is, the agency’s founding myth allowed its originators to construct, 
and reformulate over time, narratives that framed the organization in quasi-religious like 
terms. Development activities, in general, and the work of the Peace Corps, in particular, 
were reduced to culturally salient stories that presented the aims and activities of the 
organization as virtuous, charitable, and benevolent.19 This organizational presentation of 
self, relying on claims to moral legitimacy, generated widespread positive valuations of 
                                                 
19 This is notable because such narratives are typically the domain of philanthropic and charitable 
organizations rather than government agencies. The Peace Corps paves the way for this kind of narrative 
construction and sensemaking in government.  
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the Peace Corps and its volunteers among constituents and stakeholders that had 
profound implications for the organization over time. 
The success of these narratives rested, in part, on their amplification by members 
of Congress who consistently lauded the organization for its efforts at affecting change 
throughout the world. The legitimacy accorded the agency by members of Congress was 
rooted fundamentally in an assumption that the agency was engaged in a morally 
righteous endeavor and that the agency was consistently making, at some level, a good 
faith effort to achieve its objectives. Moreover, the repeated retelling of the origins myth 
by members of Congress served to maintain the legitimacy of the Peace Corps that was 
derived from associations of the agency with the charisma and reputation of President 
Kennedy. In short, the relative agreement between members of Congress and the agency 
in maintaining the founding myth served as a very potent and durable basis for the 
legitimacy of the Peace Corps. 
 The Peace Corps’ founding narrative not only animated a wide range of activity, 
but also, as I will show in Chapter Four, created space for loose coupling and buffered the 
agency from legitimacy challenges and crises over time. Moreover, I will show how the 
positive shared assumptions regarding development, in general, and the Peace Corps, 
specifically, expressed in congressional discourse and organizational narratives 
established a reservoir of legitimacy for the agency that it could draw on as it confronted 
legitimacy challenges over time. Finally, I will argue in subsequent chapters that these 
narratives, which became a core feature of the organization, created powerful path 
dependencies that, in some instances, prompted potential legitimacy crises amid the 
changing organizational and political context of subsequent decades.  








“To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds 
of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves.” 
 
       President John F. Kennedy (1961) 
 
 
“In helping others develop, we help ourselves.” 
 
       President Ronald Reagan (1985) 
 
 
“The popularity and success of the Peace Corps as an institution is a testament to the 
power of an idea that transcends both politics and partisanship.” 
 






Despite shared positive assumptions about the aims and work of the Peace Corps, 
the agency must navigate competing visions of what its activities should look like in 
practice. In December 1984, as President Ronald Reagan was making preparations for the 
start of his second term, scholars at the Heritage Foundation, an influential conservative 
think tank in Washington, D.C., published a scathing critique of the Peace Corps and its 
Reagan-appointed director, Loret Miller Ruppe. The report (1984), titled “The Peace 
Corps: Out of Step With Reagan,” leveled several accusations against the agency and its 
director for subverting the Reagan agenda. The foundation began the report by asserting: 
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President Ronald Reagan in 1981 nominated Loret Miller Ruppe to be director of 
the Peace Corps, a $100 million-per-year agency with 5,400 paid volunteers and 
1,100 full-time employees operating in 60 countries around the world. Now, on 
the eve of Reagan’s second term, the Peace Corps still largely ignores the Reagan 
Agenda. Not only have the agency and its director snubbed Reagan policy, they 
have actually fought against it on Capitol Hill. In numerous ways the Peace Corps 
has been an annoying thorn in Reagan’s side, disregarding White House 
directives, making personnel appointments without proper White House 
clearance, and dragging its heels on vital foreign policy initiatives. As a result, 
many opportunities have been missed for extending the Reagan mandate to the 
Peace Corps (Huber 1984:33). 
 
The Heritage Foundation report illuminates a persistent challenge for the Peace 
Corps. The agency must negotiate pressures from the administration, members of 
Congress, and external constituents and critics, while also implementing its congressional 
mandate as it sees fit. We begin to see that the goodwill accorded the agency discussed in 
Chapter Three is conditional. That is, stakeholders’ feelings regarding the benevolent 
purpose of the organization are coupled with assessments regarding the extent to which 
the organization’s practices align with different stakeholder’s interests. In addition to 
navigating these domestic pressures, the agency and its leadership must also be mindful 
of perceptions of the agency among constituents abroad. This chapter seeks to better 
understand these legitimacy processes by addressing the following questions: How does 
the Peace Corps maintain legitimacy as it confronts a range of political pressures at home 
and abroad? How do external pressures challenge the legitimacy of the organization? 
How does the Peace Corps respond to these pressures over time? 
 In this chapter, I argue that the Peace Corps had to be responsive to members of 
Congress and the administration in its attempts at maintaining legitimacy. I make the case 
that agency directors were forced to manage the political environment and, particularly 
during Republican administrations, were more explicit about the agency’s role in serving 
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U.S. foreign policy interests. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the mandated 
purposes of the Peace Corps. Next, I show how the Peace Corps and Congress sought to 
buffer the agency from the broader U.S. foreign policy apparatus for the purposes of 
maintaining autonomy, and to avoid perceptions abroad that the agency was an explicit 
tool to advance U.S. foreign policy interests. I then examine how the interests of the 
agency, individual members of Congress, and presidents converge and diverge over time. 
In the end, this chapter complicates the unified story of support for the Peace Corps 
presented in Chapter Three and raises questions regarding how the organization is 
ultimately assessed, evaluated, and supported by stakeholders and constituents. 
 
Overview of the Peace Corps’ Stated Purpose 
The broad aim of the Peace Corps Act, as articulated in its Declaration of Purpose 
was “to promote world peace and friendship” through the realization of three goals. First, 
the Act sought to “provide for a Peace Corps to help the peoples of interested countries 
and areas in meeting their needs for skilled manpower.” This objective, commonly 
referred to as the Peace Corps’ “First Goal” pertains to the provision of development 
assistance. The second objective of the Peace Corps Act was the promotion of “a better 
understanding of the American people on the part of peoples served.” The so-called 
“Second Goal” charges the agency with advancing public diplomacy and cultural 
exchange abroad. The final objective sought to advance “a better understanding of other 
peoples on the part of the American people.” The aim of the agency’s “Third Goal,” thus, 
is to encourage volunteers upon their return to the United States to engage in cultural 
exchange at home by sharing their experiences with others. Peace Corps’ original three 
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goals continue to guide the agency and feature prominently in nearly all printed agency 
materials. Moreover, the goals are consistently invoked in testimony and discussion of 
the agency. In short, the three goals serve as broad metrics, codified in U.S. law, by 
which the work of the Peace Corps is supposed to be organized and judged. 
Above all, the First Goal (Development Assistance) guides the activities of the 
Peace Corps and absorbs the vast majority of the agency’s resources.20 The agency is not 
in the business of providing material aid or undertaking large-scale projects. Instead, the 
agency sees itself as a unique and special branch of the U.S. international development 
effort. Peace Corps’ distinctiveness comes from its people-to-people approach to 
development, of which it sees itself as an exemplar. The agency seeks to transfer skills 
and change perceptions, attitudes, and worldviews of host-country nationals by living and 
interacting with locals. The agency takes great pride in the fact that volunteers speak 
local languages, live under similar conditions, and eat the same food as the people with 
whom they work. Such integration, according to agency officials, builds legitimacy and 
trust among those served which, in turn, allows volunteers to be more effective in their 
development work.  
The person-to-person approach used by the Peace Corps is also viewed as a 
particularly effective means of transmitting American culture21 to those abroad and 
                                                 
20 During congressional testimony in 1978, for example, ACTION Director Sam Brown asserted, “The 
most important contribution of the Peace Corps in the future must be its impact within the Third World 
nations in which it serves. Peace Corps is first a development agency; an agency which has and must 
continue to advance the kinds of village level, grassroots development recognized as being the most 
effective means of achieving positive and sustaining change for those with the greatest need” (Hearing 
1978:58).  
21 Of course, what constitutes “American Culture” and which elements of this culture are emphasized 
changes over time. Moreover, there are debates among relevant stakeholders over what elements of this 
culture should and will be emphasized.  Despite the value American’s generally purport to place on 
freedom of speech, for example, the agency places some restrictions on volunteer involvement in and 
commentary about local political issues. Indeed, in recent years the agency has emphasized in its Core 
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dispelling stereotypes of Americans. The Second Goal (Public Diplomacy/Cultural 
Exchange Abroad) formally articulates this objective. There are two discernible elements 
to this effort. The first, public diplomacy, views Peace Corps volunteers as lay-
ambassadors of the U.S. government or the “face of the American people” to the rest of 
the world. The second element, cultural modernization, imagines volunteers as 
messengers of the “American way of life” through the work that they do and the way they 
live—the attributes of which are understood to be prerequisites for development. 
Historically, the Third Goal (Public Diplomacy/Cultural Exchange at Home) has 
received minimal attention and funding by the agency and Congress, although agency 
officials, agency reports, and some members of Congress lament the “missed 
opportunity” for utilizing returned volunteers to educate the American public. In short, 
fulfilling the Third Goal is not central to planning and programming at the agency.22 Over 
the period under study, Third Goal initiatives have received a minuscule amount of the 
overall agency budget. The most tangible manifestations of the Third Goal are the World 
Wise Schools program, started in 1989, which partners volunteers who are in the field 
with elementary and middle-school classrooms in the states and the Peace Corps Fellows 
Program, started in 1985, which is comprised of a consortium of graduate schools that 
give preferential admissions consideration to returned volunteers for development-related 
graduate school programs. As noted, not all of the agency’s goals are equally emphasized 
                                                                                                                                                 
Expectations for Peace Corps Volunteers that volunteers “Recognize that you will be perceived, in your 
host country and community, as a representative of the people, cultures, values, and traditions of the United 
States of America.” Moreover, advances in electronic communication (e.g. blogs) and expanded access to 
the internet has increased agency sensitivities regarding what volunteers make public about their service 
experience.   
22 Associated with the Third Goal is the National Returned Peace Corps Association (NRPCA), a nonprofit 
organization of returned volunteers headquartered in Washington, D.C. The NRPCA is often asked to give 
congressional testimony on the Third Goal. The association has also made several attempts to be included 
in the agency budget and partner with the agency as the official Third Goal outreach arm. To date, these 
efforts have been unsuccessful. 
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in practice. As such, I omit the agency’s Third Goal in the discussion below because of 
its relatively marginal status. In the discussion that follows, we see that the emphasis 
placed on goals one and two varies over time and across constituents.  
 
The Peace Corps and U.S. Foreign Policy 
Debates concerning the role of the Peace Corps in U.S. foreign policy have 
existed since its establishment in 1961. Where agencies such as USAID are explicit about 
their role as a tool to advance U.S. interests, the Peace Corps has generally resisted such 
classification. As such, a fundamental question hangs over the agency: Whose interests 
should the Peace Corps serve? Volunteers, agency staff and administrators, members of 
Congress, and presidential administrations come to this question with varying 
perspectives that ebb and flow over time.   
In addressing the use of the Peace Corps as a tool to advance U.S. foreign 
interests during remarks to the National Advisory Council of the Peace Corps in 1961, 
President Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, asserted that “to make the Peace 
Corps an instrument of foreign policy would be to rob it of its contribution to foreign 
policy.” Rusk’s comment served as a caution to Congress and agency officials that if the 
Peace Corps were to be perceived abroad primarily as a tool of the U.S. government, or 
even more damaging, as an affiliate of the Central Intelligence Agency, then the 
organization would lose all legitimacy. In short, the strategic benefits that accrue to the 
United States from sending development volunteers abroad is better left 
unacknowledged. This tacit nod to the dual role of Peace Corps, that of aid agency and 
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public diplomacy agency, highlights the fine line the organization and Congress must 
walk in orchestrating the activities of the organization.  
The formal distinction between the Peace Corps and the broader foreign policy 
apparatus was codified in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which was amended in 
1963 to prevent prohibitions on foreign aid included in the Peace Corps Act to be applied 
to agency activities in countries that the United States government deemed problematic. 
This sentiment was reaffirmed during initial appropriations hearings in 1993, when one 
member of Congress noted that “using them [Peace Corps volunteers] as political 
leverage” was not appropriate given the agency’s “longstanding separation from foreign 
policy objectives” (Tarnoff 1998). This view was formally affirmed in 1993 when 
Congress added language to the Peace Corps appropriations bill reasserting the Peace 
Corps exception for conducting activities in countries where U.S. assistance has been 
prohibited (Tarnoff 1998). Congress has included similar language in all subsequent 
Peace Corps appropriations bills. There have been several occasions over the last fifty 
years where the U.S. government pulled embassy staff or cut various ties with 
governments abroad, yet the Peace Corps was allowed to continue operating in the 
country. One of the arguments advanced to support this position is that the Peace Corps 
is, fundamentally, people-to-people international assistance and not government-to-
government assistance. That is, if the U.S. government has an issue with the leaders of 
another country, the people of that country should not, in these instances, pay the price.  
A third issue relates to the autonomy of the Peace Corps relative to the executive 
branch. Despite formal steps to sequester the agency from the broader U.S. foreign policy 
apparatus, and numerous examples of agency and congressional calls to maintain the 
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separation, the historical record shows executive influence and involvement dating back 
to the agency’s founding. Indeed, presidents have always had a hand in shaping the 
agency and, through the authority to appointment the agency’s director, has the power to 
put in place an individual whose views align with those of the White House. However, 
this involvement is not spread consistently across all presidential administrations. As will 
be made clear, Republican administrations, and their appointed agency directors, tend to 
be far more explicit about the role of the Peace Corps in achieving broader foreign policy 
objectives.  
Under President Nixon, the Peace Corps was placed under the umbrella agency 
ACTION and was subject to significant budget cuts and interference instigated by 
members of the administration. Following the decline of the agency during this period, 
concerned members of Congress and other supportive constituents had heightened 
sensitivity to the organizational autonomy of the agency. As the agency emerged from the 
Nixon/Ford era the topic was once again at the fore. The first Peace Corps director, 
Sergeant Shriver, was asked during testimony in 1978 whether he thought there needed to 
be insulation from White House influence “so that it will not be manipulated from 
President to President” (Hearing 1978:12). Shriver responded that indeed there needed to 
be a separation for the long-term interests of the agency because, as he noted, “for every 
time that you have a President who is really committed to the Peace Corps, you have a 
chance of getting one who is really not committed to it” (Hearing 1978:152). These 
concerns were renewed during the George W. Bush presidency when, following the 
September 11 attacks, the administration sought to bring all volunteer and service 
agencies, including the Peace Corps, under the aegis of what the administration called the 
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Freedom Corps. Unlike Nixon’s ACTION agency, however, President Bush’s effort to 
establish the Freedom Corps was not an attempt to directly control the agency. 
Accordingly, concern on the part of members of Congress and other stakeholders was 
muted.  
An additional consideration with regard to the Peace Corps autonomy is the 
agency’s desire to be viewed first as a development agency and, secondarily, as a public 
diplomacy agency. At times, agency officials express concern regarding the potential 
negative consequences to agency effectiveness if constituents abroad see the agency as a 
tool of foreign influence.23 The effectiveness of the Peace Corps development model rests 
on the volunteers’ ability to integrate into the communities in which they serve. As such, 
any policy or practice that undermines the status of the volunteer as benevolent change 
agent weakens the potential development-related impact of the volunteer. Agency 
officials emphasize that associations with U.S. foreign policy or intelligence, real or 
perceived, undercut its ability to deliver effective development assistance. That is, if 
recipient governments see the Peace Corps first as a tool for the United States to win the 
favor of populations abroad, and secondarily, as an instrument for development, then a 
key basis for its legitimacy with constituents abroad will be lost. It became clear in 
congressional discourse, however, that many in Congress had little interest in the tangible 
development outcomes (i.e., First Goal) produced by Peace Corps volunteers. Instead, 
emphasis is placed on the agency’s ability to engage in public diplomacy abroad.  
                                                 
23 Agency administrators have also consistently argued that perceived affiliations of the Peace Corps with 
the U.S. foreign policy apparatus would place volunteers in danger by making them potential targets of 
enemies of the U.S government. Congressional sensitivities to this issue have risen drastically since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. 
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There are numerous examples in agency discourse and congressional testimony 
where the organization makes explicit its role in U.S. foreign policy in order to justify 
itself. In other instances, the organization is pressed by members of Congress to justify its 
actions in terms of benefits to the United States. At times, these exchanges are somewhat 
veiled and in other instances the veneer of benevolence the agency enjoys is stripped 
clean and administrators are pressed to justify the agency’s actions in purely self-
interested terms. Such exchanges reflect the competing and changing conceptualizations 
of the organization and lay bare tensions inherent in administering a government-run 
bilateral international development agency. In addition, geopolitical shifts bring out more 
transparent discussions regarding the strategic placement of volunteers. It is to the 
interplay between the interests of presidential administrations, agency directors, members 
of Congress, and a changing geopolitical environment that I now turn.  
 
Cracks in the Veneer  
As noted above, volunteers, agency staff and administrators, members of 
Congress, and presidential administrations approach the question of whose interests 
should be served by the Peace Corps from varying perspectives that fluctuate over time. 
Although the separation of the Peace Corps from the broader foreign policy apparatus is 
codified in law, this line is blurred in practice. The agency and Congress engage in a 
dance of sorts when foreign policy interests or geopolitical shifts make sending in Peace 
Corps volunteers an attractive strategic decision. 
At the outset of the period under study, however, allusion to the role of the Peace 
Corps in U.S foreign policy was muted or left unspoken in organizational documents and 
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congressional discourse. As Carter assumed the presidency, the agency leadership 
lamented the “deterioration in program quality that occurred between 1969 and 1977” 
and dedicated itself to a “resurgence and rebirth of established Peace Corps principles 
and ideals” (Justification 1979:1). The Peace Corps, then embedded in the umbrella 
agency ACTION, and under the leadership of ACTION Director Sam Brown and 
Director Carolyn Payton, committed itself to the Basic Human Needs approach to 
development and sought, in the words of Director Payton, to “cooperate with host 
countries in the basically human process of development, working on a human scale and 
in a humane way” (Justification 1977:1). Such sentiments aligned closely with the 
priorities of the Carter administration. The agency articulated its intention to work closely 
with local communities, especially the poor, to design and implement development 
programming that was rooted in people-to-people exchanges that fostered “self-help 
efforts at the community level” (Justification 1979:14). In many ways, the Carter 
administration efforts sought to recapture the altruism of the Peace Corps’ effort 
espoused in the Kennedy era.  
The Carter administration also sought to reaffirm the separation of the agency 
from other components of the federal government. Mary King, who replaced Carolyn 
Payton as agency Director in 1978, was clear when asked during testimony whether the 
agency would depart or not consider sending volunteers to a country whose government’s 
actions or ideology did not align with the interests of the United States, citing, in this 
case, President Carter’s philosophy on human rights. Referring to such issues as a 
“nettlesome question,” Director King stated succinctly, “We [the Peace Corps] do not at 
the moment utilize the instrumentalities of any other Federal agency in our analyses and 
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assessments” (Hearing 1978:33). In short, the view of the Peace Corps as an autonomous 
agency was reaffirmed.  
Despite the efforts of the Carter administration to recapture the altruism of the 
past and autonomy of the agency, a significant shift occurred in both the approach and 
tone at the Peace Corps when the Reagan administration took power. The earliest 
indication of this shift, although modest, came in 1981 when Director Richard Celeste 
referred to the Peace Corps as “an example of successful international relations” in his 
transmittal letter to congress (p. 3). Celeste’s comment was the first public indication that 
the Peace Corps was entering a period wherein the agency would be reframed to its 
constituents more explicitly as a tool for U.S. foreign policy.  
This shift took a dramatic turn under the leadership of Celeste’s successor, 
Director Loret Miller Ruppe. Ruppe was adept at framing the work of the Peace Corps in 
terms of conservative ideals and was explicit about the benefits of Peace Corps 
volunteers abroad, arguing in her second transmittal letter to Congress that U.S. volunteer 
service abroad had resulted in an “invaluable” and “incalculable reservoir of goodwill for 
America,” noting that the “need to maintain and add to this reservoir is greater now than 
ever” (Justification 1983:2). 
One of the first changes that that occurred under Director Ruppe’s leadership was 
an initiative to develop a formal partnership with USAID. USAID was known as having 
an explicit role in advancing U.S. interests abroad. In addition to the Peace Corps’ 
historic aversion to being clearly linked to U.S. government interests, the USAID 
development model of providing direct material aid to recipients was viewed as in 
conflict with the Peace Corps development model of people-to-people development. 
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Indeed, Peace Corps officials long sought to guard the agency against the perception 
among those served that the agency was one that simply provided material goods. The 
rationale for this effort was captured well in the testimony of Director Ron Tschetter, 
who argued several years later that, “Allowing volunteers to either raise funds or use seed 
funding for demonstration projects diminishes their primary objectives,” which, 
according to the Director, “goes against the agency’s basic philosophy of helping others 
to help themselves” (Hearing 2007:11). 
Despite this concern, planners at the Peace Corps and USAID began to see the 
potential in partnerships between volunteers, who knew the language and culture and live 
among the people they serve, and the material resources and development expertise of 
USAID. The partnership, introduced early in the Reagan administration, was codified in a 
memorandum of understanding between the two agencies in 1983 (Justification 1983). In 
the arrangement, USAID would provide development expertise, especially in terms of 
project planning and material inputs, and Peace Corps volunteers would implement 
USAID sponsored projects in the hinterland.  
As the USAID-Peace Corps partnership was getting underway, the administration, 
through Secretary of State George Schultz, publically reaffirmed the importance of the 
independence of the Peace Corps in a cable to ambassadors around the world. In the 
message, Secretary Schultz asserted, “To be effective, the Peace Corps must remain 
substantially separate from the formal day-to-day conduct and concerns of foreign policy 
because of its unique people-to-people character” (Hearing 2002:24). The USAID-Peace 
Corps partnership was the first indication that the longstanding separation of Peace Corps 
from the broader foreign policy apparatus was about to come to an end.  
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The shift toward greater coordination between the Peace Corps and other 
elements of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus intensified in a dramatic way in 1985, 
following the Heritage Foundation’s scathing critique of the agency and Director Ruppe. 
At the direction of the White House, the Peace Corps began to plan its activities “in full 
coordination with the Department of State and the Agency for International 
Development,” and presented a budget that, as the agency noted, “affirm[ed] the 
importance of the Peace Corps not only as a vital component of the overall U.S. approach 
to international development, but also as an important vehicle of public diplomacy” (p. 
1). Despite concerns of the past, such sentiments were echoed by members of Congress. 
Indeed, the argument that the Peace Corps should be separate from the broader U.S. 
foreign policy apparatus was met with indignation from members of Congress who 
argued that the Peace Corps, by minimizing its affiliation with the U.S. government, was 
failing in its public diplomacy efforts and, hence, wasting taxpayer dollars. 
In addition to pressures coming from the Heritage Foundation and similarly 
critical arguments by members of Congress, the agency was subject to external pressures 
coming from two influential foreign policy commissions—the Carlucci Commission on 
Economic and Security Assistance and the Kissinger Commission on Central America. 
Both commissions sought to articulate the geopolitical dangers facing the United States 
and articulate a path forward that included leveraging U.S. military and international aid 
to protect and advance U.S interests abroad. In its 1985 justification, the Peace Corps 
noted that the proposed budget they were putting forward to Congress had the 
endorsements of both the Carlucci Commission and the Kissinger Commission. 
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These endorsements were not simply based on some abstract philosophical 
alignment between the Commissions and the Peace Corps. Indeed, the coordination of the 
Peace Corps with the administration’s wishes coming out of the Kissinger Commission 
were quite dramatic. Former Nixon Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, a powerful, well-
connected, and experienced voice in foreign policy, argued strongly that U.S. 
intervention in Central America needed to be more robust in order to push back against 
what the Commission framed as the exploitation of unrest occurring in Central America 
by the Soviets and Cubans. In short, the Commission made the argument that Cold War 
opponents were at the doorstep of the United States and a strong and decisive response 
was needed. The Peace Corps was advanced as a potentially effective instrument in a 
broader push into the region. The agency and its volunteers were viewed as effective 
front-line emissaries who could spread American and modern ideologies throughout the 
region and serve as an antidote to the communist threat.  
Shortly after the publication of the Kissinger report, the Peace Corps vastly 
expanded its programs throughout Central America, increasing the overall numbers of 
volunteers in the region substantially in just one year. In justifying this move, the agency 
used language that presented an emboldened agency announcing its arrival as a player in 
the foreign affairs community. Because this marks such a dramatic shift in the public face 
of the organization, I cite text from the agency’s justification at length: 
During the past few years, the Peace Corps has experienced a confirmation of its 
place in the foreign affairs community. Since the Peace Corps’ beginning in 1962, 
it has been an axiom that its programs are not the tools of short-term foreign 
policy. It has become increasingly clear during the past year, however, that the 
Peace Corps plays an important role in advancing the long-term international 
goals of American foreign policy.  
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Recent reviews of American foreign policy, carried out at the highest level of the 
Administration, have reaffirmed the value of the Peace Corps as an international 
agency. The Commission on Security and economic assistance, chaired by 
Ambassador Frank Carlucci, endorsed the Peace Corps not only for its immediate 
positive effects on the families and villages in less-developed nations, but also for 
the enduring human resource development and institution building represented by 
23 years of continuous “people-to-people” programing. The Carlucci Commission 
singled out the over 100,000 returned Volunteers in this country as a potent 
political constituency, knowledgeable and concerned about foreign affairs.  
 
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, chaired by former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, has stressed the positive effects that will 
result from an enhanced Peace Corps presence in Central America. In fact, the 
Commission recommended a quintupling of the Peace Corps presence in that 
region.  
 
The recent internal review of U.S. foreign assistance programs conducted as part 
of the development of the President’s 1985 budget, affirmed the importance of 
Peace Corps activities. Twenty U.S. Ambassadors, responding to a survey 
representing a geographic cross-section of the developing world, expressed a 
unanimous perception of the Peace Corps as effective in promoting both 
developmental and public diplomacy goals in their countries. With this budget 
request, this Administration is affirming its continued support for the Peace 
Corps, a support that fully recognizes the importance of the Peace Corps in the 
international arena (Justification 1985:1).  
 
 The declaration above was by far the most forward affirmation of Peace Corps as 
a strategic tool to advance U.S foreign policy interests that had appeared in an agency 
budget justification to date. In some respects, the organization’s foreign policy narrative 
above stands in stark contrast to the benevolence narratives discussed in Chapter Three. 
Instead of the seemingly altruistic motive of advancing development embedded in the 
benevolence narrative, the foreign policy narrative constructs the Peace Corps purely as a 
diplomatic tool. The story put forward in this narrative is that the world is becoming more 
unstable. Countries are advancing through stages of development but democracy is 
fledgling and potential threats to the United States are becoming more real. In this 
formulation, Peace Corps volunteers serve as front line ambassadors who, through their 
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good works, mollify potential hostilities toward the United States. Accordingly, the 
tangible development effects of volunteer activities (e.g., the First Goal) became 
secondary. 
An additional window into the support of Congress for the Peace Corps is in its 
allocations to the agency. It is clear during this period that Congress was committed to 
supporting the Peace Corps through appropriation levels that would allow the agency to 
act on the foreign policy aspirations articulated above. Figure 3.1 below shows agency 
budget requests and congressional appropriations by year. Notable here is that while 
government programs, both domestic and international, were being slashed across the 
board by the Regan administration, the Peace Corps received congressional 
appropriations that exceeded its requests. Data presented in the graph show that, in 
general, the Peace Corps typically receives the funding it requests. And in times when 
threats to the United States abroad rise, so do the fortunes of the Peace Corps. In sum, if 
we are to take appropriations as an indicator of congressional support, backing of the 
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Figure 3.1 Peace Corps Budget Requests and Congressional Appropriations by 





A related issue discussed in nearly every congressional hearing on the Peace 
Corps is the setting of goals for the total number of volunteers in the field. Reagan and 
each successive president have called for an increase in the number of volunteers in the 
field. In 1985, congress amended the Peace Corps Act declaring “that it is the policy of 
the United States and a purpose of the Peace Corps to maintain, to the maximum extent 
appropriate and consistent with programmatic and fiscal considerations, a volunteer corps 
of at least 10,000 individuals” (Peace Corps Act Sec. 2 (b)). Since the Act was amended, 
the agency has yet to meet this goal. President George W. Bush, in his 2002 State of the 
Union address, proposed expansion to 14,000 Volunteers (doubling the size of the Peace 
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Corps at that time, which was 7,000 volunteers). In 2007, then presidential candidate 
Barack Obama called for doubling the size of the Peace Corps from 7,800 volunteers to 
16,000 by its 50th anniversary in 2011. Obama made similar calls as president. By and 
large, agency testimony on this matter is supportive of expansion. However, agency 
officials discourage setting an arbitrary number and timeline, favoring instead to grow the 
agency through quality programming and host-country need. They fear that sending out 
more volunteers without proper site development will hurt the agency’s reputation and 
lead to dissatisfaction among volunteers. 
The sentiments above regarding the role of the Peace Corps in advancing U.S. 
foreign policy interests and congressional support though appropriations extend into the 
George H. W. Bush presidency, whose first budget provided the biggest year-to-year 
jump in funding for the agency in twenty-five years. The Bush administration sought to 
rapidly increase the number of countries served in order to “allow Peace Corps to build a 
bridge of hope” to additional nations (Justification 1989:1).24 The administration 
portrayed the Peace Corps as a hedge against global instabilities that were thought to 
accompany shifts that were occurring in what agency and administration officials saw as 
an increasingly interdependent world. The agency noted that in these “times of global 
interdependence,” the U.S. must recognize that “the problems of countries overseas are 
also our problems” (Justification 1989:3). 
In 1991, attention shifted to the Soviet Union, where the agency noted that a “new 
era is unfolding” that will “challenge our nation as never before” (p. 1). Once again, the 
                                                 
24 In testimony to the House National Security Subcommittee, Director Paul Coverdell, explained that he 
was determined to meet as many requests for Peace Corps volunteers as he could, to work toward achieving 
what he called, “Maximum Peace Strength,” which he defined to members as “the stage at which Peace 
Corps will play a meaningful role in all countries seeking assistance” (Hearing 1990:27).  
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agency used rather dramatic language to frame the transformations occurring throughout 
the world and reasserted the role of the Peace Corps as a key player in managing these 
transitions: 
In the last two years, the political and economic structures of our world have 
changed dramatically. From Moscow to Managua, communism is out; democracy 
and free enterprise are in. From Africa to Asia and from Europe to Latin America, 
dictatorship is in disfavor. From Budapest to Buenos Aires, freedom and 
opportunity are the watchwords of a new era. [T]he walls have crumbled. The 
people have voted. The doors of small businesses are swinging open. And now, 
the real work begins. There are new philosophies, new leaders, new hopes and 
new dreams. But hopes and dreams can provide only the promise of better days 
ahead. It will be up to people to improve their own lives, step by step, one day at a 
time—and Peace Corps is ready to help (Justification 1992:1). 
 
Like the shift into Central America that followed the recommendations of the 
Kissinger Commission, the administration and members of Congress decided to move 
swiftly into the newly independent states and saw the Peace Corps as key tool in winning 
the hearts and minds of the citizens of former Soviet Republics. The agency embarked on 
a rapid expansion of programs, starting first in Hungary and Poland. The Peace Corps 
entered eleven new countries in 1990, fourteen new countries in 1991, and six more in 
1992. In total, the Peace Corps expanded from 65 countries in 1989 to 94 countries in 
1992, a 44 percent increase in just four years. Congress moved quickly to equip the Peace 
Corps with sufficient resources to support this expansion, transferring an additional tens 
of millions of dollars in appropriations annually to the agency from the New Independent 
States (NIS) fund, which was established by Congress at the close of the Cold War.  
An additional, albeit lesser-noticed, issue came to the fore at the beginning of the 
George H.W. Bush presidency. Paul Coverdell, the administration’s first appointed 
agency director, could not understand why the agency was known and promoted abroad 
simply as the Peace Corps, instead of the United States Peace Corps. In an interview 
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with the Washington Post, Coverdell agued, “I do not believe we should hide the name of 
the country that has sponsored the wonderful things we have done around the world” 
(quoted in Meisler 2012:169). Accordingly, Director Coverdell ordered all domestic and 
international Peace Corps offices to begin using agency logos and printed materials that 
read “United States Peace Corps.” This move was loudly denounced by return volunteer 
organizations and some members of Congress who argued, once again, that the agency 
would lose legitimacy if it too explicitly aligned itself with the U.S. government. Director 
Coverdell’s move was quickly abandoned following the election of Bill Clinton. 
 When Bill Clinton assumed the presidency, organizational narratives concerning 
the role of the Peace Corps in the U.S. foreign policy apparatus largely receded. There 
was an explicit shift away from a focus on public diplomacy prominent in the previous 
Republican administrations toward development activities. The agency began to 
emphasize programming focused on the environment, HIV/AIDS, and continued 
programming that sought to spread democracy. However, instead of emphasizing the 
interests of the United States, the agency noted throughout the Clinton administration that 
programming should reflect the national development strategies of the countries served 
and, once again, began to emphasize basic human needs in agency programming 
(Justification 1995). However, throughout the Clinton administration, Congress 
continued to transfer supplemental appropriations to the Peace Corps from the NIS fund. 
In 1998, the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee affirmed the continuation of 
additional NIS fund transfers to the Peace Corps and “strongly encouraged” the agency to 
“reevaluate volunteer levels in countries to reflect the shifts in U.S. priorities and 
interests in the post-cold-war environment” (Hearing 1998). Interestingly, the 
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subcommittee criticized the agency for having too many volunteers in Central America, a 
hold-over of the Kissinger Commission expansion, and an indication of shifting 
American interests abroad.  
Just as Republican George W. Bush assumed the presidency, agency language 
shifted once again to a more explicit expression of the benefits to the U.S. of sending 
volunteers abroad. In February of 2001, after remarking how volunteers embody the all 
that is good about the United States, Director Mark Schneider (2001) noted that 
“Volunteers also advance our own country’s interests by strengthening the ties of 
friendship and cross-cultural understanding. Given America’s leadership position in the 
global economy, this domestic dividend has never been more important” (Justification 
2001:1). This domestic dividend receives increased attention after the World Trade 
Center attack on September 11, 2001.25  
 Shortly after George W. Bush assumed the presidency, U.S. interests abroad 
shifted once again. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, greater emphasis was 
placed on expanding to countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Similar to 
expansion efforts following the end of the Cold War, the administration sought additional 
appropriations for the Peace Corps. In his State of the Union address following the 
September 11 attacks, President Bush asserted: “America needs citizens to extend the 
compassion of our country to every part of the world.  So we will renew the promise of 
the Peace Corps, double its volunteers over the next five years and ask it to join a new 
effort to encourage development and education and opportunity in the Islamic world” 
(Bush 2002). 
                                                 
25 Moreover, there is increased attention from outside observers regarding the use of Peace Corps 
volunteers as an instrument of American “soft power” over this period (Rieffel 2006).   
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 Similar sentiments were expressed in congressional testimony shortly thereafter 
during senate hearings in 2002 regarding a bill intended to expand and enhance the Peace 
Corps. Senator Chris Dodd, a sponsor of the bill, argued that “We [the United States] 
especially need to act in places where there are people unfamiliar or hostile to American 
values. Now more than ever Peace Corps volunteers play a pivotal role in helping to 
achieve a greater understanding of America abroad, especially in predominantly Muslim 
nations” (Hearing 2002:2). During the same hearings, Peace Corps Director Gaddi 
Vasquez noted that two-thirds of the countries that were being considered for Peace 
Corps entry were predominantly Muslim countries (Hearing 2002:12). Five years later, 
Director Ron Tschetter reported during Senate testimony that “over 20 percent of [Peace 
Corps] volunteers were working in 15 predominantly Muslim countries” (Hearing 
2007:5). The emphasis by the agency and members of Congress on expansion into 





Chapter Four sought to examine the interplay of claims to legitimacy, as well as 
the complexity of legitimacy processes, between the Peace Corps, Congress, and the 
White House. Agencies must manage their organizational presentation of self in order to 
maintain legitimacy as political environments shift. This chapter shows how the Peace 
Corps changed and adapted to the political realties it faced under different political 
regimes.  
As described in Chapter Three, the Peace Corps’ founding narrative became 
deeply embedded in the organization, which had powerful path-dependent consequences. 
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While the narrative served as a potent source of legitimacy, it also paved the way for a 
potential legitimacy crisis in subsequent decades as members of Congress and 
presidential administrations sought to explicitly use the agency to meet political 
objectives abroad. These efforts to politicize the organization directly challenged the 
original founding narrative, undercutting the organization’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
rank-and-file as well as various external constituencies.  
Because the agency depends on the support of Congress for its continued 
existence, it needed to walk a fine line in managing its desire to maintain autonomy with 
the immediate need to garner the support of members of Congress. As pressures on the 
agency to align its work with the strategic interests of the United States began to rise, the 
organization’s leadership had to decide if it would yield to pressures from the 
administration and members of Congress or seek to maintain legitimacy through the 
separation of the agency’s activities from the U.S. foreign policy apparatus.  
Making the Peace Corps an explicit component of U.S foreign policy was, in 
many ways, antithetical to the agency’s founding myth. As discussed above, the Peace 
Corps was designed to be, at least in appearance, an apolitical and autonomous arm of the 
U.S. international aid regime at its founding—a separation that was codified in U.S. law. 
As such, calls for the agency to become more explicitly political created fundamental 
crises of legitimacy for the agency. Although the instrumental logics guiding members of 
Congress’ desire to use the Peace Corps as a tool of foreign policy made strategic sense, 
it threatened the reservoir of legitimacy that was built over time by the organization. 
Indeed, this reservoir of legitimacy was based on qualities—charity and benevolence—
that are in many respects fragile and, if not guarded closely, easily tarnished. So while the 
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Peace Corps’ founding myth was clearly a strength for the organization, in this instance, 
it also made the agency particularly vulnerable.  
The external pressures placed on the organization to adapt to political realities 
were most acute during the Regan presidency. In this period, the agency had to navigate 
its desire to work in accordance with the foreign policy interests of the White House and 
members of Congress, while also maintaining its autonomy. The agency’s capitulation to 
the Kissinger Commission laid bare the power of the executive and Congress to influence 
the activities of the Peace Corps. We see in the case of Director Ruppe, an adept attempt 
to align the agency’s activities with the interests of Congress. In managing its 
presentation of self to Congress through these pressures, the organization reframed its 
purpose to align its claims for legitimacy to fit the political demands of the organizational 
environment. In short, the agency maintained legitimacy through a loose coupling of its 
legitimacy claims. On the one hand, the Peace Corps shifted some of its resources to 
countries of strategic interest and expanded its work into sectors such as small business 
development. By and large, however, the vast majority of Peace Corps volunteers 
continued the agency’s long-standing legacy of trying to meet the basic needs of those 
served, while fostering a “self-help” philosophy rooted in notions of the transformative 
potential for individuals and communities abroad. 
In sum, this Chapter Four shows how the institutionalization of one set of 
legitimacy claims and associated narratives preceded emerging foreign policy narratives 
which, in practice, led to decoupling and produced some reframing of the organization’s 
activities. The demands of the organizational environment placed new pressures on the 
organization to transform its operations, but the organization’s strong founding narrative 
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impeded radical transformation. Indeed, if there was not such a strong founding narrative, 
we might have otherwise expected that the Peace Corps would have changed more 
dramatically. Instead, the agency was able to buffer itself from the effects of competing 
political pressures. The agency adopted some alternative narratives but, by and large, 
these narratives were only loosely coupled to organizational activity. In the end, some 
practices of the organization did change, but the agency was able in large part to buffer 
itself from drastic shifts by managing a strategic Goffmanian presentation of self and 
again relying on path dependencies rooted in the organization’s founding narrative. In 
sum, the findings presented above demonstrate that legitimacy processes not only bring 
about policy-practice decoupling, but also the loose coupling of legitimacy claims 
themselves. 








How can we on this subcommittee be assured that the Peace Corps is meeting its 
legislative goals? How do we know that the Peace Corps is providing real and durable 
benefits for the developing countries and how can we be confident that the volunteers are 
both personally rewarded and better citizens for their experience? 
  
          Rep. Michael Harrington (1979)  
 
 
Organizations whose ultimate goal is to produce a complex good face the challenge of 
developing meaningful metrics of accomplishment and clearly establishing the causal 
efficacy of particular programs or activities. 
Bromley and Powell (2012:18) 
 
 
When asking the question of whether development has happened or not, the answer must 
be grounded in the faith that it is possible to believe that development can happen. In 
other words, development cannot be evaluated without making assumptions about those 
who make development and those who evaluate it. Assumptions involve questions of 
belief and faith.  
         





 In the late 1990s the Peace Corps faced a new set of pressures and potential 
threats to its legitimacy. Although the agency enjoyed widespread support based, in part, 
on shared positive assumptions about its activities, as well as self-interested assessments 
of the agency by its constituents, the agency would not escape widespread calls for 
greater government accountability. Indeed, recent research suggests that contemporary 
organizations face increasing and more intense external pressures, especially in terms of 
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pressures for assessment and accountability, as well as the rise in “audit cultures” that 
emphasize continual monitoring of organizational activity through performance and 
outcome measurements (Bromley and Powell 2012; Strathern 2000). The motivation for 
legitimacy moves organizations to demonstrate that they have in place policies and 
practices that are understood by the external environment to be in line with what a 
“legitimate” development agency should be doing. In short, there is an incentive for 
organizations to appear as though they are engaged in all of the “right” practices in order 
to garner support. Based on the arguments made in Chapter Three, it is possible, 
however, that development organizations have greater latitude in this area because of the 
low bar to which development organizations are held and the built in “logic of 
confidence” that accompanies activities that are perceived as being charitable. In short, 
development organizations may have a built in legitimacy buffer because of the nature of 
their work.  
Chapter Five examines how the organization adapted to the rise of the 
accountability regime in the 1990s and beyond. During this period, all government 
agencies were facing greater scrutiny. Congress passed the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) in 1993, which mandated that all government agencies develop 
clear, measurable performance outcomes that they were required to report to Congress 
annually. In short, the GPRA created new political and cultural pressures on the 
organization to have legitimate processes in place to demonstrate organizational 
performance. To examine these issues, I address the following questions: How does the 
rise of the accountability regime in the 1990s change the Peace Corps? How does the 
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organization modify its narratives and practices in order to maintain legitimacy under the 
new regime?  
The chapter begins with an examination of evaluation and assessment practices at 
the Peace Corps prior to the rise of the accountability regime. I then provide a brief 
overview of the origins and effects of audit cultures for government practices. Next, I 
detail how the agency responded to the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) mandate and framed its activities to Congress. Finally I consider how, after ten 
years of the GPRA mandate, the Peace Corps begins to align some of its policies, 
assessments, and practices.  
 
 
Virtuous Endeavors: Evaluation and Assessment at the Peace Corps (pre-GPRA) 
 Throughout the history of the Peace Corps, the agency has made various attempts 
at assessing and evaluating its work. Efforts have included individual evaluations of 
volunteers, country reviews, and sector studies (e.g., education). However, there has been 
no comprehensive or longitudinal research done on the effectiveness of Peace Corps 
volunteers and agency programming to date.26 Moreover, the evaluations that have been 
conducted by the agency are limited in scope. Despite the paucity of empirical evidence 
regarding agency and volunteer effectiveness, organizational narratives and congressional 
discourse are replete with positive assessments of agency and volunteer activity. These 
assessments come in a variety of forms.  
                                                 
26 Indeed, when collecting data at the National Archives and Peace Corps Headquarters in 2007, I 
interviewed the agency’s head of research, evaluation, and measurement. During the meeting, I inquired 
about the availability of agency documents pertaining to evaluation, noting that I had only come across a 
couple such studies in my archival research. She commented that she, too, was surprised to find such a 
limited amount of systematic evaluation at the agency and indicated she was unsure “what else was out 
there.” She then asked that I forward to her any evaluation reports or materials I came across in the 
archives.  
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 Anecdotes provide the vast majority of supportive evidence. One category of 
anecdotal evidence comes in the form of quotations from community members and 
leaders in recipient countries. A typical example comes from the Peace Corps’ 1981 
budget justification. The agency quotes Adrian Guzman, identified as a community 
leader in Fortuna, Costa Rica who says, “In 1964 we had in Fortuna only people and 
problems. We had no roads, no high school, no health center, no electricity, nothing. So 
that’s why we asked the Peace Corps to send a volunteer. From this organization we have 
built a new village with new ideas, new roads, a new high school, a health center, 
electricity, and telephone. We now have new hopes for the lives of our citizens” 
(Justification 1981:24). In short, the story asks constituents to believe that the presence of 
Peace Corps volunteers can and has transformed entire communities. 
References to individual volunteer projects are a second category of anecdotal 
evidence frequently used by agency officials. During testimony in 1992, Director Elaine 
Chao relayed a series of volunteer success stories to members of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs that presented Peace Corps volunteers as sacrificing individuals 
transforming individual lives and communities throughout the world. Director Chao 
offered stories about individual volunteers in Bulgaria, Honduras, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Sierra Leone, ending her comments by saying, “I 
mention these not as anecdotes, but as a representative sample of some of the wonderful 
work that I see our volunteers do throughout the world” (Hearing 1992:55). By 
effectively narrating the experiences of the volunteers, in the context of shared 
assumptions about the goodness of progress and development, the agency is able to 
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project a benevolent and effective identity, one that members of Congress generally 
accept even in the face of no or very limited empirical evidence. 
 The agency and members of Congress also frequently cite the demand for 
volunteers abroad as an indicator of effectiveness. The agency notes in 1984, for 
example, that “the demand for our services—a vital, tangible measure of the success of 
our volunteers and programs—continues to greatly outstrip our capacity to supply 
volunteers” (Justification 1984:1). When Director Loret Ruppe was asked by a member 
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs how she would answer the question, are we 
satisfied that we [the Peace Corps] are doing a good job [and] that we are making a 
difference, she indicated that the agency was continually evaluating programs in the field, 
although these evaluations had been cut back due to budget considerations. Director 
Ruppe did not provide any findings from said evaluations, referencing instead a rise in 
requests for volunteers as an indicator of success. Her comment was readily accepted by 
committee members. 
 A final indicator of agency success used frequently in congressional discourse and 
organizational narratives is the continuation of volunteer presence in a given country. 
That is, a recipient government’s desire to continue hosting Peace Corps volunteers is 
taken as a measure of support for the work that volunteers do. Such a metric for success 
runs somewhat counter to an informal philosophy of the agency, which is to “work itself 
out of a job.” That is, if the agency is indeed successful at bringing about individual and 
community development that, rooted in its people-to-people model, results in greater 
capacity among those served, then there should be a point at which continuation of 
volunteer assignments in a given location is an indicator of failure rather than success. 
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This point, however, is left largely unaddressed in congressional discourse and 
organizational narratives. Indeed, the only example in my analysis of thirty-five years of 
congressional discourse and organizational narratives came from the president of the 
National Council of Returned Peace Corps Volunteers during Senate testimony who 
noted that the Peace Corps had, at that time, been in Ghana and Sierra Leone for 29 years, 
yet there had not been one summative study of the contributions of Peace Corps 
volunteers in these countries (Hearing 1990). 
 Despite the relative paucity of systematic evidence of effectiveness, the agency 
consistently makes sweeping assertions about its work to Congress in documents and 
testimony. In 1984, the agency asserts that its “proven record of help remains as strong as 
ever” (Justification 1994:1). Three years later, the agency’s transmittal letter to congress 
notes that, “Peace Corps has a proven twenty-five year track record of providing 
assistance through programs which are effective both in terms of impact and cost” 
(Justification 1987:1). In another justification, the agency asserts, “Their [volunteers] 
work in more than 100 nations has significantly improved the lives of millions of people” 
(Justification 1992:1). Yet, consistently, the agency is not able to substantiate such 
assertions with data other than those mentioned above.  
 The organization shows that it is aware, at times, that its attempt at providing 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of volunteers is constrained. This is especially true 
with regard to development outcomes (i.e., Goal One). In 1977, for example, the agency 
notes, “The developmental accomplishments of the Peace Corps are not always easily 
measured. Human development is unquantifiable, and progress is often frustratingly 
slow” (Justification 1977:10). The agency goes on to assert that volunteers “know they 
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had a hand, even if only in a small way, in changing how some of the world’s most needy 
people live” (Justification 1977:10). Periodically, the agency administers a 
questionnaire27 to collect data directly from volunteers to assess impact. The results 
include raw counts of indicators such as the number of students taught, fish ponds 
constructed, and livestock inoculated. The agency also refers to the “more intangible 
results” of volunteer activities that are said to be “elusive aspects” of Peace Corps 
development activities (Justification 1982:4). The list of “elusive aspects” reads as 
characteristics of cultural and psychological modernization, and includes such items as 
raising the consciousness of local people, providing a practical orientation, fostering 
problem-solving, stimulating ideas, and motivating communities. The section then 
concludes: “Even though such achievements cannot be measured, they are an integral 
part of the Peace Corps’ role and relate to the development of the host countries” 
(Justification 1982:4).  
Members of Congress have, periodically, raised concerns over program 
evaluation at the Peace Corps. During congressional hearings in 1981, members of the 
Senate Committee on Appropriations took issue with the agency’s proposal in its FY 
1981 budget to reduce the amount of funds it requested for evaluation. The agency 
proposed to phase out its internal evaluation staff and rely instead on contractual program 
evaluation. Committee member Senator Bob Kasten (R-WI) pressed the agency on this 
point, asking: “How do you justify elimination of evaluation in light of the expressed 
                                                 
27 The Peace Corps has surveyed volunteers periodically from 1973-2002 when a biennial survey was 
instituted. The survey has been conducted annually since 2009. The agency notes in the 1982 budget 
justification that the volunteer surveys “provide a basis for measuring and evaluating Peace Corps’ 
accomplishments” (Justification 1982:3).  
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intention of Congress to increase our efforts in this area?” (Hearing 1982:593). The 
agency, in a written statement, responded to Senator Kasten’s question this way: 
Although we are phasing out our in-house evaluation staff, we are not eliminating 
the “evaluation function”. Rather, we are refocusing how we undertake program 
evaluation. We fully realize Congress’ interest in program evaluation. However, 
we feel that “interest” has been tempered by the need to adjust Federal spending 
overall. Our choices have not been easy. We have tried to balance the need for 
some evaluation capacity, however reduced, with maintaining effectiveness of our 
on-going program overseas (Hearing 1982:593).  
 
 The agency’s attempt to maintain evaluation in times of both budget surplus and 
constraint has, as noted above, been limited. Indeed, a congressional report titled, “The 
Peace Corps: Entering Its Fourth Decade of Service,” made the following observations 
regarding its analysis of evaluation at the Peace Corps: 
In general, program evaluations at the Peace Corps have been sporadic, uneven, 
sometimes resisted by staff, largely ineffectual and…underfunded. They 
presuppose the existence of up-to-date project plans and applicable criteria, 
management tools often conspicuous by their absence in the agency’s field 
operations.  
 
In 1987 an agency task force proposed measures to “reinstitutionalize” evaluation 
with the establishment of a central Evaluation Service as a “field-driven staff unit 
of the Peace Corps director.” It was, according to one knowledgeable official, the 
17th time the agency has attempted to do so. At the present time, only one person 
at headquarters has been assigned full-time to this function, funding has been 
negligible, and it remains to be seen whether this 17th effort will get off the 
ground (GAO 1990:18). 
 
 Similar sentiments are expressed in various Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and congressional reports. For example, a sector study of Peace Corps education 
programming in 1984 asserted that, “One of the most striking features of the Peace Corps 
education sector is how little knowledge exists about what has been achieved after almost 
20 years of programming,” noting also that “the lack of substantial knowledge is true of 
other programming sectors as well” (Landrum 1984:89). A 1986 report commissioned by 
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the House Select Committee on Hunger, conducted in conjunction with the 25th 
anniversary of the Peace Corps, claimed that “although over 100,000 volunteers have 
served in 92 developing countries, systematic evaluation of their periods of service are 
virtually non-existent. Most of the information available is anecdotal” (Hearing 1986:9). 
In testimony before the Senate National Security Subcommittee, a representative from the 
GAO office noted that until recently, the agency had “no central policy for evaluating and 
monitoring [volunteer] assignments” (Hearing 1990:38).28 
 Despite consistent concerns regarding evaluation and outcomes expressed in 
GAO and select congressional reports, actual discussion of agency shortcomings is 
virtually absent in exchanges between the agency and members of Congress. Perhaps it is 
unsurprising that project or program failures are completely written out of the agency’s 
budget justifications to Congress. After all, these documents are intended to garner 
support for the organization rather than raise doubts, so there might be an incentive to 
omit such information. However, it is somewhat surprising that even reports of the 
organization commissioned by Congress to evaluate agency effectiveness generally do 
not make their way into hearings.  
 One exception to this pattern came in the early 1990s when the agency was being 
pushed by Congress and the White House to rapidly expand into the former Soviet 
Republics. These programs got off to a rough start because of a lack of planning and 
preparation on the part of the agency. The House Committees on Government Operations 
and Foreign Affairs requested a GAO review of programming in this region. The study 
found that volunteers were sent to sites that were not properly vetted and volunteer 
                                                 
28 Starting in the late 1990s the Peace Corps Inspector General’s office began to conduct more systematic 
country financial audits and program evaluations, yet these efforts were also quite irregular.  
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training, especially language instruction, was not adequate (GAO 1994). In the rush to 
send volunteers to the region, the GAO said that the Peace Corps did not follow its 
established procedures for country entry. As a consequence, there was great 
dissatisfaction among volunteers and a higher than normal rate of early termination.29 
During testimony following the publication of the report, Director Carol Bellamy 
acknowledged that the programs in the former Soviet Republics were a very difficult 
challenge, but the agency was taking steps to remedy the situation (Justification 1995:1). 
One year later, although no specific evidence was provided, the agency reported that 
activities were generally going well in the post-Soviet Republics and that the region had 
great potential (Justification 1996:111). 
 
The Rise of the Accountability Regime  
The rise of neoliberal forms of governance have had a profound impact on the 
practices of government agencies throughout the world. At its core, neoliberal 
governance “seeks to manage public activities by finding proxies for market 
mechanisms” (Holmwood 2010:640) in a way that is argued to be a more efficient means 
to manage public activities and associated resources. So called “audit cultures” make 
accounting a central organizing principle of organizational activity (Strathern 2000). 
Advocates of this form of governance argue for the development of quantifiable measures 
of organizational performance such as targets, outcomes, and objectives. As a 
consequence, government agencies develop elaborate accountability systems that seek to 
measure and evaluate organizational activity, with the ultimate goal of bringing about a 
                                                 
29 Early termination refers to the ending of a volunteer’s term of service prior to the standard twenty-seven 
month appointment. Of particular concern to the agency are instances when a volunteer terminates her 
service because of dissatisfaction with placement or preparation for service.  
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more effective and efficient system. In the early 1990s, the U.S. Congress was swept up 
in this turn toward neoliberal forms of governance and accountability. It is to the effects 
of this shift in governance on the policies and practices of the Peace Corps that I now 
turn. 
 
Virtuous Procedures: Responding to the Government Performance and Results Act 
 In August 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) into law.30 During the signing, President Clinton remarked that, 
“like many big organizations, ours is primarily dominated by considerations of input, 
[and] much less about output” (Clinton 1993:10). The GPRA, however, was about to 
force all federal agencies to produce evidence that their performance matched the 
objectives set for them. In short, these agencies were going to have to demonstrate 
outcomes. Moreover, agencies were going to be held accountable for their performance in 
a way that had not been enforced in the past.  
 The passage of the GPRA marked a fairly dramatic shift in how the Peace Corps 
measured and documented its work. The GPRA mandated that all government agencies 
develop and submit to congress on an annual basis: 1) a five-year strategic plan with 
“results-orientated” goals, that needs to be approved by the Office of Management and 
                                                 
30 As stated in the Congressional Record (1993), the official purposes of the GPRA are to: (1) improve the 
confidence of the American people in the capability of the Federal Government, by systematically holding 
Federal agencies accountable for achieving program results; (2) initiate program performance reform with a 
series of pilot projects in setting program goals, measuring program performance against those goals, and 
reporting publicly on their progress; (3) improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability 
by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction; (4) help Federal managers 
improve service delivery, by requiring that they plan for meeting program objectives and by providing 
them with information about program results and service quality; (5) improve congressional  decision 
making by providing more objective information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and (6) improve internal management of 
the Federal Government. 
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Budget; 2) a performance plan that articulates specific performance goals and measures 
to verify if the goals are being met; and 3) a performance report detailing the agency’s 
success or failure in meeting its performance targets.  
GPRA agency performance plans, referred to as Performance and Accountability 
Reports (PAR), were required to be submitted to Congress for the first time in the 1999 
budget cycle. The Peace Corps submitted its first PAR to Congress in 1998.31 
Reminiscent of elements in the pre-GPRA discussion above, the agency began its first 
PAR indicating that: “It is important to note that the Peace Corps, its mission, and the 
work of its Volunteers do not easily lend themselves to GPRA measurements,” adding 
“while it is possible to measure some aspects of the agency’s success in providing 
technical assistance to developing countries, it is less clear how to capture the intangible 
benefits to host countries and our own nation of the cross-cultural exchanges that are an 
essential part of Volunteer service” (Justification 1998:205). 
However, as a part of the GPRA implementation, the agency articulated specific 
indictors intended to measure its success in meeting the Peace Corps’ Three Goals. The 
indictors were derived from the agency’s FY 1997-2001 strategic plan, which articulated 
seven32 general goals for the agency that were broken into Outcome Goals.33  Each 
                                                 
31 The Peace Corps effort to respond to the requirements of the GPRA rested, according to agency officials, 
on an internal assessment system, the Integrated Planning and Budgeting System (IPBS), a system used by 
the agency for strategic planning purposes that predated the GPRA. In addition, the 1997 budget 
justification indicates that, for the prior two years, the agency conducted evaluations of all country 
programs based on a standardized, although unarticulated, set of criteria. The results of these evaluations 
are not reported in the justification or made public in congressional testimony. 
32 In brief, the first goal pertains to the safety of volunteers, the second to expanding opportunities for 
Americans to serve abroad, the third is to meet all reasonable country requests for volunteers, the fourth 
pertains to providing short-term humanitarian assistance, the fifth is to strengthen volunteer training and 
programming, the sixth pertains to expanding Third Goal initiatives, and the seventh seeks to cut agency 
costs and improve productivity (Justification 1998:211). 
33 For the purposes of clarity and consistency I adopt the titles for the goals and indictors adopted by the 
agency in the FY 2003-2008 strategic plan. In earlier plans the equivalent of Outcome Goals was referred 
to as Performance Goals, and Performance Goals were referred to as Performance Measures. 
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Outcome Goal had a corresponding set of Performance Indicators, which were intended 
to constitute quantifiable measures of agency performance. In its presentation of the 
1997-1998 PAR, the agency notes that it “fulfills its mission [i.e., The Three Goals] by 
making it possible for American citizens to serve as volunteers in developing countries 
and participate in the development efforts of their host communities” (Justification 
1998:207).Conspicuous by their absence in the earliest measures, however, are any 
tangible performance indicators that approximate what an outside observer would deem 
to be legitimate measures of development outcomes or impact on host community 
conditions or perceptions (i.e., Peace Corps’ Goals One and Two).  
In the first two years of PAR reports (2004 and 2005) based on the FY 2003-2008 
strategic plan, the agency takes as indicators of success toward Goal One (Development 
Assistance): 1) increased numbers of volunteers sent into the field; and 2) a reduction in 
the number of volunteers who quit before their 27-month term of service is complete (i.e., 
early termination). The implicit assumption here is simply that having more volunteers in 
the field results in more “development”. Once again, however, there is no discernible 
attempt to measure actual development impacts or outcomes on the ground. There is also 
no attempt to measure or report on progress toward Goal Two (Public 
Diplomacy/Cultural Exchange Abroad) in these reports. 
In 2006, the agency revised its FY 2003-2008 strategic plan and put forward what 
it called a “set of ambitious but achievable performance goals” that included a new 
combined measure of Goals One and Two (Development Assistance/Public Diplomacy). 
The new indicator, transfer skills and understanding,  is measured by a question on the 
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Close of Service (COS) survey administered to volunteers.34 The Peace Corps (2006) lists 
the new transfer skills and understanding outcome goal as follows: “Broaden the impact 
of Volunteers on the lives of men and women in their host communities by transferring 
tangible skills, as measured by increasing Volunteers reporting in the Peace Corps’ close-
of-service (COS) survey that they were “adequately” to “exceptionally” effective in 
transferring knowledge and skills to members of their host community, from 80 percent 
in FY 2006 to 82 percent by FY 2008.” The question on the COS survey reads: “How 
effective have you been in transferring knowledge and skills to help members of your 
host community build their capacities?” The response set is a five-point likert scale that 
includes the following response categories:  (1) not at all, (2) minimally, (3) moderately, 
(4) considerably, or (5) exceptionally. The 2006 PAR also provides data on the total 
number of individuals (e.g., students, farmers, community members) assisted and service 
providers (e.g., teachers, health clinic workers, agricultural extension agents) trained by 
volunteers. These measures are also derived from volunteer self-reports.  
 It is important to note that despite the fairly dramatic changes in agency 
assessment procedures described above, congressional testimony regarding the activities 
and effects of the Peace Corps abroad do not change substantially over this period. 
Indeed, PAR reports are barely mentioned by members of Congress. In short, the broader 
narrative the agency tries to tell with its findings—that it is going a great job—is 
generally validated by members of Congress despite the relatively weak measures or 
claims of success that are bought to bare.  
 
                                                 
34 The COS survey is simply a questionnaire completed by all volunteers at the end of their 27-month term 
of service. As noted above, the agency also administers an annual survey of all volunteers. 
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Accountability, Recoupling, and Narratives Revisited 
 Approximately ten years after the implementation of the GPRA and after 
countless attempts at articulating and measuring the impacts of Peace Corps activities and 
reporting to Congress, the organization experienced another, albeit now familiar, call to 
reconsider how it accounts for agency performance. In the Peace Corps’ 2009 budget 
justification transmittal letter, Director Ron Tschetter stated plainly, “While there is an 
intrinsic understanding of the great value the Peace Corps brings to the world, the agency 
needs to better measure its impact in quantifiable ways” (Justification 2009:vi). To 
realize this goal, Director Tschetter looked to the Office of Strategic Information, 
Research, and Planning (OSIRP). The OSIRP, established in 2007, was envisioned as an 
internal accountability mechanism charged with “enhancing the agency’s strategic 
planning and reporting, evaluation and measurement, and data governance efforts” 
(Strategic Plan 2008:5).  
 The OSIRP’s first major undertaking was to develop the agency’s 2009-2014 
strategic plan. In comparison to earlier efforts, this plan was notable for its level of depth 
and detail. The plan articulated five new strategic goals for the organization that more 
directly aligned with Peace Corps’ Three Goals. In developing the strategic plan, the 
Peace Corps sought to more clearly and concretely articulate, through what it called a 
“logic model,” how the agency’s organizational “activities and processes are linked to its 
outputs and outcomes, or results and impacts” (Strategic Plan 2008:5). In short, the logic 
model was a comprehensive roadmap intended to guide the agency’s policies and 
practices. Appendix B includes the agency’s rendering of the model.  
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The 2009 PAR was based on the FY 2009-2014 strategic plan’s new and more 
elaborate set of strategic goals and performance indicators. In particular, the plan was 
more explicit about the need to measure outcomes for Goals One and Two (Development 
Assistance/Public Diplomacy). The strategic plan also provided a more comprehensive 
set of indicators for each goal. For example, Strategic Goal 1—Enhance the capacity of 
host country individuals, organizations, and communities to meet their skill needs—
included ten measureable indicators. The agency again, however, relied heavily on 
volunteer self-reports to demonstrate evidence of achieving outcome goals. 
Another major turning point for assessment efforts at the Peace Corps occurred in 
December 2009, when Congress passed, and President Barack Obama subsequently 
signed, the Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law 111-117). This law included 
congressional appropriations for several federal departments and agencies, including the 
Peace Corps, which received its largest year-to-year funding increase in more than a 
decade. Language was attached to the Peace Corps appropriation that mandated the 
agency to produce and submit to the Committees on Appropriations “a comprehensive 
assessment of the current program model of the Peace Corps and a strategy for reforming 
and improving operations” no later than 180 days after the enactment of the act (Public 
Law 111-117:123).  
In June 2010, just one year before the agency would celebrate its 50th anniversary, 
Director Aaron Williams delivered the Peace Corps’ Comprehensive Agency Assessment 
report to Congress. In the report’s executive summary, the agency began with a very 
familiar organizational narrative by referencing the legacy of President Kennedy. The 
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summary continues with language that, too, harkens back to narratives used previously to 
justify the agency: 
The Peace Corps is still very much in demand from both its host countries and the 
American public. Presidents and cabinet ministers in dozens of countries credit 
their start to Peace Corps Volunteers who touched their lives at an early age. 
Peace Corps Volunteers in 77 host nations are kindling a fire in the leaders of 
tomorrow. The fact that requests for Volunteers still far exceed the Peace Corps’ 
capacity to place them within its budget is a clear and convincing measure of the 
Peace Corps’ importance to many nations and its impact around the world. Peace 
Corps Volunteers are America’s best and most cost effective grassroots 
development workers, magnifying the impact of government and donor 
investments at the community level and ensuring that efforts funded by others are 
community-owned and sustained. Peace Corps Volunteers are America’s best 
ambassadors, building relationships with strategic partner countries from the 
ground up in communities across the globe (Peace Corps 2010:1).  
 
In short, despite significant and real efforts to advance assessment and evaluation 
at the Peace Corps, the dominant sensemaking narratives offered by the agency persist in 
the absence of solid quantitative measures to support the claims made in these narratives.  
Perhaps the most substantive shift in program evaluation coming out of the FY 
2009-2014 strategic plan was an ambitious effort to begin conducting country-level 
studies of effectiveness. This effort began in 2008, when the Peace Corps first piloted in-
country field evaluation studies referred to as Host Country Impact Studies. The studies 
were intended to determine the impact of volunteers in meeting Goals One (Development 
Assistance) and Two (Public Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange), and were guided by the 
following research questions: 1) Do host country individuals think Peace Corps 
volunteers and the community projects on which they work meet locally defined needs?; 
and 2) Does Peace Corps Volunteers’ work increase community members’ understanding 
of Americans? These studies were the first substantive attempt by the agency to 
incorporate the views of the agency’s partners (e.g., host family members, recipients of 
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services, and counterparts) into its sensemaking about the extent to which the agency is 
achieving its development and public diplomacy goals. To collect the data, OSIRP hired 
and trained a local research staff in each country to conduct in-depth interviews with 
people who lived and worked with Peace Corps volunteers. At this time, the agency has 
completed and made public 14 Host Country Impact Studies that, on the whole, indicate 
that frequent and prolonged contact with Peace Corps volunteers does have an impact on 
the knowledge of the United States and its citizens among those served by the Peace 
Corps (Radelet 2011). To date, no documents have made available that report detailed 
findings from the agency’s assessment of recipients’ perceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of volunteers as it pertains to Goal One (i.e., development impact). In the 
future, the agency plans to make this data available and is also currently expanding the 
impact studies effort to include additional countries. The overarching objective in this 
effort is, for the first time in the 50-year history of the Peace Corps, to collect systematic, 
comprehensive data for all countries in which it works that will inform agency 
programming into the future. In remains to be seen if this attempt will succeed, or like so 





Chapter Five sought to unpack the consequences of rising expectations for 
evaluation and assessment on the legitimacy of the Peace Corps. As noted above, the 
practical implications of shared positive assumptions about development and public 
diplomacy held by members of Congress and agency officials served to erase or 
minimize failure and shift attention away from the lack of tangible evidence for agency 
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outcomes. In this sense-making environment anecdotes are taken as legitimate and 
sufficient evidence, project failures are minimized or erased, and claims of success are 
readily accepted. With the exception of calls by members of Congress for shifts in the 
placement of volunteers to better serve the strategic interests of the U.S. government, 
there are few serious calls for agency accountability in terms of the stated aims (i.e., 
Three Goals) of the agency in the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
Although one might expect that the rise of the accountability regime would 
undermine the legitimacy of the Peace Corps given its limited attempts and ability to 
measure impact, the findings above indicate that the agency’s legitimacy remained 
largely intact. This is perhaps due, in part, to the fact that the primary metric for 
measuring the performance of the agency was transcendental in nature. In other words, 
there was a deep sense in organizational narratives and congressional discourse that the 
Peace Corps was engaged in a moral endeavor, wherein any development was better than 
no development. Accordingly, the agency seemed to escape close scrutiny of its 
performance with the exception of periodic calls for greater evaluation that, typically, 
went unheeded. In short, the agency was given wide latitude in its endeavors.  
However, in the late 1990s, the agency was subject to new pressures arising from 
the implementation of an accountability regime put in place by Congress. The Peace 
Corps faced a mandate to identify outcome goals and develop explicit measures of 
agency performance. Prior to the implementation of the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA), the agency made only modest attempts at measuring its impact, 
none of which were comprehensive. With the exception of occasional calls for greater 
accountability and more systematic evaluations of organizational performance, Congress 
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largely accepted the limited amount of evidence for organizational effectiveness put 
forward by the Peace Corps as a legitimate basis for continued support. Whereas the 
legitimacy derived from the organization’s adoption of foreign policy narratives had the 
potential to undermine the legitimacy of the agency, claims to legitimacy rooted in the 
accountability regime appeared to be a form that was complimentary to the founding and 
benevolence narratives. This is likely true, in part, because of the profoundly decoupled 
nature of agency practices and measures of performance. In the end, legitimacy derived 
from compliance with the accountability regime served as new basis for organizational 
legitimacy for the Peace Corps instead of a threat.  
 For the first ten years of the GPRA, the agency produced data for reporting 
purposes, yet the data produced were only loosely coupled to the stated aims of the 
organization and, as such, the agency was allowed to justify its activities is non-concrete 
ways. However, toward the end of the period under study, we begin to see a closer 
alignment between the stated aims of the organization, in terms of development outcomes 
and public diplomacy, and the measurement of these aims, with the advent of the effort 
by the Office of Strategic Information, Research, and Planning to produce Host Country 
Impact Studies in 2008. Although all of the data for these reports are not yet available 
and only a relatively small number of country-level studies have been completed, it is fair 
to say that this effort represents the most significant attempt by the Peace Corps to 
measure its impact to date. Moreover, the effort has the potential to spur a degree of 
recoupling at the Peace Corps not previously observed. We will have to wait to see the 
extent to which the founding narrative, which has guided the legitimacy claims of the 
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organization for so long, is eventually displaced by accountability narratives rooted in 
evidence of agency effectiveness in the years to come.  
 









This dissertation investigated legitimacy processes in the field of international 
development by addressing the following questions: How do development organizations 
maintain legitimacy? How do development organizations present themselves in different 
historical periods and political climates? Under what conditions and in what 
combinations are different legitimacy strategies deployed? The study sought to build on 
research in organizational sociology and development studies, in particular, recent work 
on the narrative construction of legitimacy. More specifically, I examined the narrative 
construction and maintenance of legitimacy (i.e., legitimacy processes) in one 
international development organization, the United State Peace Corps, over the thirty-five 
year period from 1977 to 2012. This period spanned five different presidential 
administrations, several significant geopolitical shifts including the end of the Cold War, 
and numerous shifts in the political make-up of the U.S. Congress. Drawing on an 
extensive analysis of a wide range of organizational documents and congressional 
discourse, I show how the construction and maintenance of legitimacy is a negotiated, 
and sometimes contested, process that involves a wide range of legitimacy claims. In 
sum, this study demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of legitimacy, both in terms of the 
range and types of legitimacy available, as well as the strategies deployed to garner and 
maintain organizational legitimacy.  
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The findings of my dissertation show how and why the Peace Corps was 
successful in maintaining legitimacy over time. The Peace Corps’ success was due, in 
part, to the agency’s ability to tap into prevailing frames regarding the benevolence of the 
United States and its citizens as well as its efforts to align organizational narratives and, 
to some degree, its practices, with the strategic interests of its constituents. Indeed, 
theoretical approaches to legitimacy differ primarily in the extent to which they see 
legitimacy as deriving from features of the institutional environment (i.e., structure) or 
from instrumental action on the part of organizational actors (i.e., agency). Institutional 
theorists argue that legitimating environments present organizations and their members 
with taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), 
which serve as dominant models that guide organizational structure and behavior (Scott 
1994; Meyer and Scott 1992). Legitimacy derives from alignment with said models. 
Scholars working in the strategic-interests tradition argue that organizations and their 
managers extract legitimacy from their cultural environments through the manipulation 
and deployment of symbols in order to gain support (Pfeffer 1981). This approach 
envisages managers as strategic actors who, although constrained by their organizational 
environments, have the capacity to influence the perceptions of others to benefit the 
organization (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). My findings indicate, as Suchman (1995) 
noted, that, in practice, organizations draw legitimacy from both their institutional 
environments and through strategic efforts to narrate the intentions and activities of the 
organization in ways that comport with the interests of its constituents. Few studies have 
sought to disentangle these differing conceptualizations of legitimacy processes in the 
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field of international development, yet, in the case of the Peace Corps, we see the 
importance of this theoretical and conceptual distinction.  
My findings indicate that the Peace Corps gained and maintained legitimacy both 
though its alignment with prevailing cultural scripts, including those associated with 
modernization and assumptions about the benevolence of the United States, as well as 
through its strategic attempts to align the interests of the agency with the prevailing 
foreign policy interests of Congress and the administration by adopting organizational 
narratives supportive of the expansion of the Peace Corps to strategic locations. In 
Chapter Three, I argue that the legitimating narratives that arose during the agency’s 
founding are tightly linked to the agency’s success throughout the period under study. 
Rooted in modernization theory and the Kennedy mystique, these early narratives operate 
as quasi-religious like legitimations of the organization. I show how the work of the 
Peace Corps and understandings of development more broadly, were reduced to powerful 
stories that presented the aims and activities of the organization as virtuous, charitable, 
and benevolent. This organizational presentation of self, which relied on claims to moral 
legitimacy, generated widespread positive valuations of the Peace Corps and its 
volunteers among constituents and stakeholders and had powerful path-dependent 
consequences for the organization.  
The legitimacy accorded the agency by its constituents were based, in part, on the 
assumptions that the agency was engaged in a virtuous endeavor and that the agency was 
making good faith efforts to achieve its objectives. I argue that these positive valuations 
of the Peace Corps created a reservoir of legitimacy on which it could draw during times 
of challenge. In Chapter Four, I argue that the Peace Corps was largely successful in 
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navigating the challenges it faced, as evidenced by such indicators as the avoidance of 
legitimacy crises and the support of Congress through annual appropriations. In short, 
members of Congress afforded the organization moral and pragmatic legitimacy through 
their provision of resources and by discursively constructing the agency as a legitimate 
and benevolent component of the U.S. foreign policy regime. This support, however, 
came at a cost.  
At points throughout the period under study, but particularly during the Reagan 
administration, the Peace Corps faced significant pressure to shift its focus toward 
meeting the short- and long-term strategic foreign policy interests of the United States. 
The efforts to politicize the agency by Congress and the administration directly 
challenged the founding and benevolence narratives, creating a situation where there was 
a real threat to the agency’s legitimacy in the eyes of the rank-and-file as well as various 
internal and external constituencies. To navigate these pressures, the Peace Corps 
actively sought to increase its legitimacy through the deployment of foreign policy 
narratives that aligned with the strategic interests of members of Congress and the 
Reagan administration. Although this move made short-term strategic sense for agency 
management with regard to the maintenance of congressional support, the shift 
represented an abandonment of the organization’s explicit founding ideals. In practice, 
the actual programmatic shifts undertaken during this period affected only a relatively 
small number of countries and individuals, however, the potential cost to the legitimacy 
of the organization, especially to its constituencies abroad, was significant. In short, my 
findings suggest that the shift evident in organizational narratives and congressional 
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discourse produced some reframing of the Peace Corps’ activities, but was only loosely 
coupled to agency practices.  
Chapter Five turned our attention to how the Peace Corps responded to new 
pressures to maintain organizational legitimacy deriving from the rise of neoliberal 
governance. Facing a new set of demands for accountability and organizational 
outcomes, the agency had to develop explicit measures of agency performance and report 
annual progress to Congress. My analysis shows that prior to this turn toward 
accountability, the agency and Congress relied heavily on assumptions about the 
goodness of development and the agency, as detailed in Chapter Three, in its assessments 
of organizational effectiveness. In short, the Peace Corps enjoyed relatively modest 
scrutiny with regard to its outcomes prior to the passage of the Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA) in 1993. Indeed the agency relied primarily on anecdotal 
evidence to support its claims to effectiveness.  
The GPRA created new political and cultural pressures on the organization to 
have legitimate processes in place to demonstrate organizational performance. During 
calls for greater accountability, government agencies might implement more visible 
mechanisms for measuring organizational activities and outputs. Organizations that are 
able to adapt to the new accountability regime are more likely than organizations that 
appear out of step with institutional expectations to persist. I show in Chapter Five that 
although the Peace Corps implemented a comprehensive, formal system of evaluation 
and assessment, it was largely ceremonial in nature and did not create legitimacy crises 
for the organization. Instead, the accountability regime created an additional means for 
the Peace Corps to create and maintain legitimacy. In short, compliance with the Act 
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provided the Peace Corps a new set of legitimacy claims based on legitimated measures 
of organizational performance that, upon closer scrutiny, were only loosely coupled with 
the Peace Corps’ Three Goals.  
I also show, however, that in the most recent iteration of performance indicators 
and efforts at measuring agency impact by the Peace Corps, there appears to be closer 
alignment with organizational practices, efforts to measure impact, and presentation of 
results. In short, we start to see at the end of the period under study, and after ten years of 
the GPRA, movement toward a recoupling of means and ends at the Peace Corps. This 
finding aligns with recent institutional research that shows the gap between policy and 
practice might not be as wide or frequent as once thought (Bromley and Powell 2012). In 
short, organizations are under increasing pressure to demonstrate effectiveness and 
provide evidence of outputs under regimes of accountability deriving from the external 
organizational environment.  
In addition to its contributions to debates in the sociology of organizations 
literature, this dissertation also makes a contribution to the development studies literature. 
As noted, research in development studies gives limited consideration to the topic of 
organizational legitimacy and has only recently begun to consider the socially 
constructed, institutional character of legitimacy (Ossewaarde, Nijhof, and Heyse 2008; 
Lister 2003). This literature also relies heavily on cross-sectional designs, which ignore 
important historical and temporal dimensions of the construction and maintenance of 
organizational legitimacy. The present study sought to address these shortcomings and 
show how assessments of organizational effectiveness often rely less on evidence of 
outputs and demonstrated impact on aid recipients than on various legitimacy claims.  
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Finally, this dissertation also makes a contribution to our historical understanding 
of the U.S. Peace Corps. There are numerous books and studies that examine various 
elements of the Peace Corps story. There are, however, no studies to my knowledge that 
investigate the relationship between the agency, administration, and Congress with regard 
to the construction and maintenance of organizational legitimacy over time. This window 
into the Peace Corps reveals a complex set of relationships and dynamics that help 
students of the Peace Corps better understand its persistence, as well as the ways in which 
the organization has changed and evolved over time. It is my hope that this study makes a 
contribution to our understanding of this important development agency.  
 
Limitations, Future Directions, and Closing Thoughts 
 Despite the contributions of this dissertation noted above, it is important to 
recognize that the conclusions and theoretical insights rest on the examination of a single 
case. As noted above, case study research is sometimes critiqued as a method, in 
particular, for its inability to provide a basis for scientific generalization (Yin 2013). 
However, the aim of this dissertation from the outset was not of generalization to a 
population, but to theoretical propositions. In short, my overarching goal in this 
dissertation was to better understand social processes, in this case, the construction and 
maintenance of legitimacy over time. A secondary limitation pertains to the data used in 
this study, which reflect only the public face of Congress and the Peace Corps. For 
example, in developing annual reports or presenting information in congressional 
hearings, individuals and organizations are likely more mindful of the words used and 
messages sent. That is, the intent of such documents is to make a specific case to an 
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audience, here Congress, that past activities, current performance, and future plans for the 
organization are legitimate and worthy of support. What is not reflected in the data used 
for this dissertation are the many internal conversations, tensions, and debates regarding 
the Peace Corps and its activities. No doubt, such data would tell an equally interesting 
story to the one presented here.  
 Of course, for every limitation, there is an accompanying opportunity for a future 
study. It is clear from my reading of organizational documents from other government 
agencies and development organizations that concerns regarding the production and 
presentation of outcomes found at the Peace Corps are shared by organizational 
administrators. Accordingly, future research could examine the extent to which the 
patterns of congressional discourse and narrative construction presented above 
characterize the legitimacy processes of other development organizations.  
In addition to a future investigation into the internal documents of the Peace 
Corps, it might also be fruitful to expand outward to examine how organizational 
narratives presented in official documents at agency headquarters and to members of 
Congress are translated in substance and form and communicated to country directors and 
in-country administrators in Peace Corps countries abroad. Indeed, we might think of the 
Peace Corps as a sort of multi-national corporation. Above, I have shown how the 
organization constructs and maintains legitimacy at headquarters, but there are also 
legitimacy processes that play out in the variety of international contexts within which 
Peace Corps operates. In each of these locations, the agency must construct and maintain 
legitimacy with national and local governments, communities, and a wide range of 
individuals. One wonders, for example, how the legitimacy claims made by agency 
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administrators during the Reagan era were conveyed to agency staff abroad and, perhaps, 
actively shielded from local staff and government representatives.  
Finally, this dissertation raises important questions about the nature of 
development practice and evaluations of development activity. It is my hope that this 
work has helped to clarify the nature of legitimacy processes in the field of international 
development and their contribution to the persistence and evaluations of development 
organizations. The finding that development outcomes have been consistently measured 
in very superficial terms, yet claims of success abound, raises questions about the 
sensemaking and true impact of development activity. The persistent lack of evidence is, 
perhaps, not surprising to institutional scholars, but it should certainly raise concern 
among those interested in advancing the needs of developing countries and communities 
across the globe.  
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Appendix B.  Peace Corps Logic Model (Peace Corps 2010) 
 
